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Multiple Large Shareholders And Owner-Manager Compensation: Evidence From French Listed Firms
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Amdouni, Sarra Boubaker, Sabri |
| Copyright Year | 2015 |
| Abstract | The objective of this study is to examine the relation between complex ownership structures and managerial compensation. More specifically, we examine the impact of the owner-manager’s excess control and the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the owner-manager’s compensation. Using a sample of French publicly listed firms, the results reveal several important points. First, the owner-manager’s compensation increases with the owner-manager’s excess control. This finding indicates that managers use their power to increase their pay, hence expropriating minority shareholders. Second, the presence of MLS decreases managerial opportunism and prevents owner-managers from diverting corporate resources for their own benefit. Hence, MLS play an important monitoring role. |
| Starting Page | 1119 |
| Ending Page | 1130 |
| Page Count | 12 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.19030/jabr.v31i3.9243 |
| Volume Number | 31 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://clutejournals.com/index.php/JABR/article/download/9243/9275 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i3.9243 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
