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Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries ∗
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Fujita, Masahisa Weber, Shlomo |
| Copyright Year | 2003 |
| Abstract | In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries and immigrants that come from “the rest of the world.” The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias toward immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quota. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries’ choices. It turns out that a country with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonized immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/e/CORE/dp2003-95.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Choice Behavior Complementarity theory Hospital admission Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Large Nash equilibrium Policy |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
