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Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice : the Cournot-bertrand Model
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay, Carol Horton Isariyawongse, Kosin |
| Copyright Year | 2011 |
| Abstract | Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/economics/2012_-_ber_-_cournot-bertrand.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/economics/2012_-_ber_-_cournot-bertrand.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Bertrand (programming language) Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Nash equilibrium |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
