Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Collective Commitment ∗
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Roessler, Christian Shelegia, Sandro Strulovici, Bruno H. |
| Copyright Year | 2016 |
| Abstract | Consider collective decisions made by agents with evolving preferences and political power. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? The answer is characterized by a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage: When the condition holds, the only agreement which may be reached, if any, coincides with the equilibrium without commitment. When it fails, as with time-inconsistent preferences, commitment may be valuable. We discuss applications and ways to facilitate the obtention of an agreement under power consistency. JEL: D70, H41, C70 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1787/9789264086081-7-en |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~bhs675/CommitmentInertia.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
