Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
La Justification De la Legislation Comme Jugement Pratique
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Tremblay, L. Bruno |
| Copyright Year | 2001 |
| Abstract | L'objectif de ce texte est d'examiner la force de trois conceptions contemporaines de Ia justification de la I6gislation conque cormne l'expression de jugement pratique. La notion de jugement pratique sous-tend l'idre que la lIgislation exprime des jugements indiquant ce qui est permis, ce qui convient ou ce qui ne convient pas de faire dans un contexte donn. En soutenant que les raisons expliquant pourquoi ]a justification a longtemps 6t6 6vacu~e des rdflexions sur ]a 16gislation ne tiennent g6ndralement plus, l'auteur propose les principaux crit~res d'une bonne justification, notamment, son caractare acceptable, pertinent, suffisant, universel et intelligible aux fins dune dvaluation critique rationnelle. Ensuite, l'auteur examine les trois conceptions dominantes de la justification de la l6gislation: Iajustification cons~quentialiste, la justification diontologique et lajustification procdurale. Ces notions peuvent 8tre associres a trois conceptions de ]a dtmocratie telles que Ia d6mocratie majoritariste, la d~mocratie liberale et la d~mocratie dlibrative. L'auteur prdconise Ia these gtndrale selon laquelle ]a troisi~me conception de la justification pourrait, a certaines conditions, satisfaire aux crit~res de bonne justification, si les deux premieres conceptions n'y parviennent pas. The objective of this article is to examine the strength of three current conceptions of the justification of legislation conceived as the expression of practical judgment. The notion of practical judgment underlies the idea that legislation expresses judgments indicating what is permitted, what is appropriate, or what is not appropriate to do in a given context. In arguing that the reasons explaining why the idea of justification has long been lacking in reflection on legislation are generally no longer tenable, the author proposes the principal criteria of a good justification, notably its character as acceptable, pertinent, sufficient, universal, and intelligible to the ends of a critical and rational evaluation. Next, he examines the three dominant conceptions of the justification of legislation: consequentialist, deontological, and procedural. These notions can be linked to three conceptions of democracy: majoritarian, liberal, and deliberative. The author advocates the general thesis according to which the third conception of justification could, in certain conditions, satisfy the criteria of good justification, if the first two conceptions do not. |
| Starting Page | 59 |
| Ending Page | 59 |
| Page Count | 1 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Volume Number | 47 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2834938-47.1.Tremblay.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
