NDLI: Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare : A Laboratory Investigation

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Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare : A Laboratory Investigation

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Stranlund, John K. Murphy, James J. Spraggon, John M.
Copyright Year	2008
Abstract	This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of riskneutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low. Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to predict significantly higher violations than we observe when subjects have strong incentives to violate their emissions permits, individual emissions control responsibilities are distributed among firms as predicted.
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/jmurphy/papers/PermitsWelfare.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://www.umass.edu/resec/sites/default/files/ImperfectEnforcementofEmissionsTradingandIndustryWelfareFinalNovember2012.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://works.bepress.com/john_stranlund/12/download/
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201206.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://people.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/documents/ResEcWorkingPaper2008-1.pdf
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Aggregate data Aggregate function Choice Behavior Emission - Male genitalia finding Experiment Failure Hoc (programming language) Inductive reasoning License Policy Regulation Social Welfare Specification Sulfur Dioxide Tobacco Smoke Pollution Type enforcement United States Environmental Protection Agency responsibility
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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