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CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #16: The Price of Anarchy in First-Price Auctions
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | In this lecture we pass from second-price to first-price auctions — auctions where you pay your bid. We haven’t said much about pay-as-bid auctions in this or the previous course. The reason is that we’ve been focusing on auctions that are easy to participate in and that have strong incentive guarantees, like dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility. In this part of the course, where we focus on simple auction formats in which it’s not necessarily easy to figure out how to bid, the second-price auction loses its luster. The simultaneous second-price auctions studied in the last two lectures offers bidder with nonadditive valuations no dominant strategies, and we didn’t even try to figure out what their equilibria look like. Indeed, given the choice between a first-price and a second-price pricing rule for a simultaneous single-item auction format, the former might well strike many bidders as simpler to reason about. In any case, first-price payment rules are now at least as well motivated as second-price rules, and we study them in this lecture. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/w14/l/l36.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
