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CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | The first scenario — identical items and unit-demand valuations — corresponds to special case in which μi(j) = 0 for all i and j ≥ 2. The second and third scenarios — which have non-identical goods but restrict to additive or unit-demand valuations, respectively — are incomparable to this one. Our goals are the usual ones — a simple ascending auction that is EPIC and in which sincere bidding leads to a welfare-maximizing allocation. Most aspects of the following solution are simpler than in the unit-demand case we just studied, but we’ll see that nonunit-demand valuations do introduce one important complication. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/w14/l/l24.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
