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Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Instituto De Filosofia E Ciências Humanas Programa De Pós-graduação Em Filosofia
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Nero, Franco Soares, Antunes |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | This paper aims to show that Hume’s claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume’s theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can’t conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can’t believe in something that we can’t conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression “external object” in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there’s not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume’s theory of belief in external objects because it’s not the case that we can’t conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/16907/000707856.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
