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Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Instituto De Filosofia E Ciências Humanas Programa De Pós-graduação Em Ciência Política
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Coelho, Arthur Moellman Júnior, Dornelles |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | This thesis addresses the so-called war power in the United States, seeking to understand the institutional dynamics of the decision on the use of armed forces abroad in the light of the constitutional provisions and the historical experience of the country. The established controversy is on who, after all, is invested by the sovereign powers of war, ie, whether it is the legislature or the executive who would possess the power to take the country to war. With this objective, this thesis analyzes the so-called War Clause which ensures to Congress the power to declare war, and also the Commander in Chief Clause, which gives the President the command of the military forces of the country. Our working hypothesis asserts that there is, in the light of the original intent, a prevalence of war powers of the President of the United States, represented by its turn, in its sovereign control over the decision of war that defies the Constitution and its system of checks and balances, leading to the hypertrophy of the Executive Branch. In an effort to understand this shift we conducted a study about the decision of the Korean War in 1950. Korea is understood as a paradigmatic case that expresses the institutionalization of the war powers of the president, with the empowerment of the Commander in Chief Clause vis-à-vis the War Clause. We observe that the dynamics of the decision found in the Korean War is part of a still ongoing process of strengthening of presidential power, hampering the use of the War Clause. Another hypothesis of the thesis is that the decisions to use force originating from multilateral organizations such as the UN Security Council and NATO have favored the prevalence of the power of war of the President of the United States, as they have been interpreted as a substitute for authorization decisions that would have to be taken only by Congress. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/88345/000911860.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
