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CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #18: Multi-Parameter Revenue-Maximization
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | With this lecture we commence the fifth and final part of the course. All previous lectures focused on the objective of maximizing the welfare ∑n i=1 vi(Si) of an auction. In these last three lectures, we study the objective of maximizing the revenue ∑n i=1 pi of an auction. Of course, all of the auctions that we've studied to generate revenue, but only as a side effect of the quest for incentive-compatible welfare-maximization. In effect, are we switching perspectives from that of a non-profit-maximizing entity (like a government) to that of a monopolist. Alternatively, we're moving from a competitive market, where competition might prevent monopoly pricing, to a non-competitive market. This change in objective leads to a quite different theory. One thing in common between this part and previous ones is that major progress has been made just in the past few years, in particular in the theoretical computer science literature. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/w14/l/l38.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
