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Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul Instituto De Filosofia E Ciências Humanas Curso De Pós-graduação Em Filosofia
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Alegre, Porto |
| Copyright Year | 2007 |
| Abstract | This work is intended to motivate and defend epistemological disjunctivism, the view that perception is a factive and rationally grounded state. This version of disjunctivism is presented as a dissolution of the underdetermination skeptical paradox. Facing the dream skeptical problem, epistemological disjunctivism is taken in conjunction with an enactive conception of perception, whose core thesis is that perceptual states are constituted by one's actions in the environment. The conjunction of these two theses promotes an embodied notion of rationality, according to which rationally grounded perceptual states are achieved by the exercise of one's abilities in the environment. That view is threatened by the apparently plausible intuition that individuals in skeptical scenarios could be rational even if they lacked the bodily means to interact with their surroundings. This intuition is defeated by a critique to the way skeptical scenarios are conceived. Lastly, radical enactivism is applied to selfknowledge, attaining a middle ground between the perceptual and the rationalist models of self-knowledge. Key-words: skepticism; epistemological disjunctivism; phenomenological disjunctivism; radical enactivism; embodied cognition; embodied rationality; self-knowledge. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/157027/001018105.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/169018/001048278.pdf?sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
