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Multi-Unit Assignment Under Dichotomous Preferences
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Ortega, Josue |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof. Both solutions are disjoint. |
| Related Links | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.10897 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3309074 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3309074 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2018-12-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Dichotomous Preferences Multi-unit Assignment Lorenz Dominance Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |