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Centralized Course Allocation
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Romero-Medina, Antonio Verondini, Matteo Maria Triossi |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable priorities. In addition, we prove that under slot-specific priorities, the immediate acceptance mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria. Finally, we present modifications of both mechanisms and show that we can dramatically reduce the complexity of the message space when preferences are responsive. |
| Related Links | https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/27388/1/we1807.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3225162 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3225162 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2018-08-02 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Operations Research and Management Science Renegotiable Acceptance Immediate Acceptance Multi-unit Assignment |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |