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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Kolotilin, Anton Mylovanov, Tymofiy Zapechelnyuk, Andriy Li, Ming |
| Copyright Year | 2016 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments. We also characterize the optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if the state is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies. |
| Related Links | https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/11504/1/Kolotilin_2017_Persuasion_Economet_AAM.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=2913916 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.2913916 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2016-11-19 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Bayesian Persuasion Information Disclosure Information Design Mechanism Design Without Transfers Persuasion Mechanisms |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |