Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Dosis, Anastasios |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive compatible and individually rational for the agent type by type allocations). Based on these properties: (i) it constructs a more robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of the “if part” of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992), and, (ii) it establishes that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of that theorem holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate beliefs. Second, it provides a sufficient condition that allows for the complete characterisation of the set of equilibrium allocations even in environments in which single crossing is not satisfied. |
| Related Links | https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02130454/file/WP_1905_DOSIS.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3388863 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3388863 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2019-04-05 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Mechanism Design Informed Principal Rothschild-stiglitz-wilson Allocation Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |