NDLI: Game theoretical analysis of collaborative social applications

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Al-Dhanhani, A. Mizouni, R. Otrok, H. Al-Rubai, A.
Copyright Year	2012
Description	Author affiliation: Khalifa Univ. of Sci., Technol. & Res., Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (Mizouni, R.; Otrok, H.) \|\| Etisalat BT Innovation Centre, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (Al-Dhanhani, A.; Al-Rubai, A.)
Abstract	During the last decade, social applications have witnessed a rapid growth in their use. Millions of people are utilising them on a daily basis in order to share their experience, information and to communicate with their family members and friends. Lately, these technologies have been used to foster collaboration in education, however, it is a case of hit and miss and without established techniques to ensure or replicate success. A number of factors contribute to the limited success of such groups, one such factor is the presence of selfish members. A selfish user adopts a free riding behaviour that takes advantage of the collaborative group without contributing back. Such a behaviour will affect the group's sustainability and affect the participants willingness to contribute. To improve the survival of educational groups in social applications, free riding behaviour needs to be studied, its impact on the group survivability assessed and then addressed. In this paper, we formally analyse the impact of the free riding behaviour by means of repeated game theory where classical and generous Tit-for-Tat are used.
Starting Page	628
Ending Page	634
File Size	1409167
Page Count	7
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781467327404
DOI	10.4108/icst.collaboratecom.2012.250665
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2012-10-14
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	ICST
Subject Keyword	Game Theory Social Applications Free Riding Tit-for-Tat Distance measurement Collaborative Learning Collaborative Groups
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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