NDLI: Study on the distribution in residual control right of accounting standards

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Sun Ni-na Wang Fu-sheng Song Hai-xu
Copyright Year	2009
Description	Author affiliation: School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, China, 150001 (Sun Ni-na; Wang Fu-sheng; Song Hai-xu)
Abstract	Accounting standards is a kind of incomplete contract and its residual control right belongs to enterprises' stakeholders. Stakeholders participating in accounting policy choice (SPAPC) is a method of distribution in residual control right of accounting standards. The strategy choice among stakeholders is a process of repeated game. Stakeholders choose strategy on the basis of the present value of their benefit in the game and they may adjust the strategy according to others' choice. The strategy change speed is related to rate of stakeholders choosing the strategy initially. The state of Nash equilibrium means that all stakeholders can choose the accounting policy which can reflect enterprises' income status factually. In the process of SPAPC, stakeholders constrain with each other, which can avoid inefficiency of accounting policy choice and earnings manipulation of management. It's helpful to solve the matching problem between residual control right and residual claim right and decrease institution change cost of accounting standards.
Starting Page	1335
Ending Page	1340
File Size	177635
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424439706
DOI	10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5318036
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2009-09-14
Publisher Place	Russia
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Costs Decision making Conference management Nash equilibrium residual control right residual claim right Game theory Sun Technology management Engineering management earnings management Optimal control strategy accounting standard Contracts
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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