NDLI: Optimal contract of the manufacturer in closed loop supply chain under asymmetric information

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Zhang Fu-an Da Qing-li Wang Wen-ping
Copyright Year	2009
Description	Author affiliation: School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, China, 211189 (Zhang Fu-an; Da Qing-li; Wang Wen-ping)
Abstract	Similar to open loop supply chain, due to asymmetric information, there is the moral hazard and incentive conflict in closed loop supply chains, which may lead to bad performance and decrease profit. To deal with this problem, in the context of a single-manufacturer and single-retailer closed loop supply chain, the game between manufacturer and retailer was studied from the point of principal-agency theory. Then the contracts with which the manufacturer can coordinate the system under symmetric and asymmetric information were analyzed respectively. It was concluded that the manufacturer can utilize a menu of contracts to screen the private information to avoid the moral hazard of the retailer and promote her own profit. Finally, the result was validated by numerical analysis.
Starting Page	374
Ending Page	379
File Size	189484
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424439706
DOI	10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5317406
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2009-09-14
Publisher Place	Russia
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Supply chain management Supply chains Pulp manufacturing Conference management asymmetric information Hazards contracts Game theory coordination Ethics Numerical analysis Engineering management Contracts closed loop supply chain
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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