NDLI: Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Ruihao Zhu Shin, K.G.
Copyright Year	2015
Description	Author affiliation: Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA (Ruihao Zhu; Shin, K.G.)
Abstract	The rapid growth of wireless mobile users and applications has led to high demand of spectrum. Auction is a powerful tool to improve the utilization of spectrum resource, and many auction mechanisms have been proposed thus far. However, none of them has considered both the privacy of bidders and the revenue gain of the auctioneer together. In this paper, we study the design of privacy-preserving auction mechanisms. We first propose a differentially private auction mechanism which can achieve strategy-proofness and a near optimal expected revenue based on the concept of virtual valuation. Assuming the knowledge of the bidders' valuation distributions, the near optimal differentially private and strategy-proof auction mechanism uses the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction payment scheme to achieve high revenue with a high probability. To tackle its high computational complexity, we also propose an approximate differentially PrivAte, Strategy-proof, and polynomially tractable Spectrum (PASS) auction mechanism that can achieve a suboptimal revenue. PASS uses a monotone allocation algorithm and the critical payment scheme to achieve strategy-proofness. We also evaluate PASS extensively via simulation, showing that it can generate more revenue than existing mechanisms in the spectrum auction markets.
Starting Page	918
Ending Page	926
File Size	344372
Page Count	9
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781479983810
DOI	10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218463
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2015-04-26
Publisher Place	Hong Kong
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Privacy Cost accounting Resource management Wireless communication Computational complexity Conferences Computers
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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