NDLI: Equilibrium existence results for simple economies and dynamic games

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Kleindorfer, P.R. Sertel, M.R.
Copyright Year	1972
Description	Author affiliation: International Institute of Management, Berlin, Germany (Kleindorfer, P.R.; Sertel, M.R.)
Abstract	The purpose of this paper is to bring some simplicity and generality to the investigation of equilibrium existence in certain "simple" dynamic games. The way we deal with these objects is, essentially, by reducing them to what we term "simple economies", these latter being, from the viewpoint of equilibrium existence results, at once more general and less cumbersome. In §1, we exhibit some topological facts about a certain rather general class of simple economies, including the fact (1.7, Main Theorem) that they each possess a non-empty and compact set of equilibria. Then, in §2, we define the simple dynamic games of interest, immediately reducing them (2.5, Reduction Lemma) to the simple economies studied. In §3, we show (3.0) that the simple dynamic games in question have non-empty and compact sets of equilibria, using the fact (1.7) that the simple economies to which they reduce have such sets of equilibria. We then illustrate by example (3.3) that a general class of discrete-time, deterministic games with convex performance criteria is covered by the equilibrium existence results just described. This class includes dynamic games for which certain non-linearities in the next-State map are allowed, and for which controls are restricted to compact regions, these regions themselves varying as a function of state. Of course, we do not intend that results particularized to this quite special example be understood as the main thrust of the paper.
Starting Page	138
Ending Page	143
File Size	495762
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
DOI	10.1109/CDC.1972.268965
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	1972-12-13
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Topology Game theory Sufficient conditions Performance analysis Artificial intelligence
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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