NDLI: Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Tran, N.H. Do, C.T. Shaolei Ren Zhu Han Choong Seon Hong
Copyright Year	1983
Abstract	Demand response programs have been considered critical for power grid reliability and efficiency. Especially, the demand response of datacenters has recently received encouraging efforts due to huge demands and flexible power control knobs of datacenters. However, most current efforts focus on owner-operated datacenters, omitting another critical segment of datacenter business: multitenant colocation. In colocation datacenters, while there exist multiple tenants who manage their own servers, the colocation operator only provides facilities such as cooling, reliable power, and network connectivity. Therefore, colocation has a unique feature that challenges any attempts to design a demand response program: uncoordinated power management among tenants. To tackle this challenge, two incentive mechanisms are proposed to coordinate tenant power consumption for demand response under two different scenarios. First, in the case of economic demand response where the operator can adjust an elastic energy reduction target, we show that there is an interaction between the operator and tenant strategies, where each side maximizes its own benefit. Hence, we apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze this scenario and derive this game's equilibria. However, computing these equilibria can be intractable with exhaustive search; therefore, we propose an algorithm to find the Stackelberg equilibria with linear complexity. Second, in the case of emergency demand response where a fixed energy reduction target must be fulfilled, we devise two incentive schemes with the distributed algorithms that can achieve the same optimal social cost. While the first algorithm is based on the dual-decomposition method that is suitable for nonstrategic tenants, the second one is designed for strategic tenants to achieve a unique Nash equilibrium of a bidding game. Finally, trace-based simulations are also provided to illustrate the efficacy of our proposed incentive schemes.
Starting Page	2892
Ending Page	2905
Page Count	14
File Size	2232379
File Format	PDF
ISSN	07338716
Volume Number	33
Issue Number	12
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2015-01-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Load management Servers Economics Power demand Game theory Green communications Cooling incentive mechanisms Colocation datacenters demand response distributed algorithms
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Networks and Communications Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

1Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

A truthful incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in colocation data centers

A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Emergency Demand Response in Geo-Distributed Colocation Data Centers

An online incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in geo-distributed colocation data centers

Coordinated Colocation Datacenters for Economic Demand Responce

Geographical Load Balancing for Online Service Applications in Distributed Datacenters

Pricing Bilateral Electricity Trade between Smart Grids and Hybrid Green Datacenters

Datacenters as Controllable Load Resources in the Electricity Market

Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

Similar Documents

Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

1Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

A truthful incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in colocation data centers

A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Emergency Demand Response in Geo-Distributed Colocation Data Centers

An online incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in geo-distributed colocation data centers

Coordinated Colocation Datacenters for Economic Demand Responce

Geographical Load Balancing for Online Service Applications in Distributed Datacenters

Pricing Bilateral Electricity Trade between Smart Grids and Hybrid Green Datacenters

Datacenters as Controllable Load Resources in the Electricity Market

Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters