NDLI: Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

Cascading behavior in social and economic networks

Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information

Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here

Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks

Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools

Unbalanced random matching markets

Super-efficient rational proofs

Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities

Bertrand networks

Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation

Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and design

The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games

Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method

Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders

A markov chain approximation to choice modeling

Optimizing password composition policies

Harnessing the power of two crossmatches

Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker"

When do noisy votes reveal the truth?

Robust incentives for information acquisition

Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approach

Auctions with unique equilibria

Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networks

Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy

On discrete preferences and coordination

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments

Mechanism design via optimal transport

Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents

Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders

Failure-aware kidney exchange

A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. elections

Incentives, gamification, and game theory: an economic approach to badge design

A network approach to public goods

Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterization

Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries

Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply

Pricing public goods for private sale

Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions

Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design

Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents

What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets

Complex contagion and the weakness of long ties in social networks: revisited

Incentivizing participation in online forums for education

Privacy and coordination: computing on databases with endogenous participation

Real-time optimization of personalized assortments

Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games

The menu-size complexity of auctions

Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers

A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions

Selection and influence in cultural dynamics

Measuring the performance of large-scale combinatorial auctions: a structural estimation approach

On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design

Designing for diversity in matching: extended abstract

Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"

Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games

Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies

Down-to-the-minute effects of super bowl advertising on online search behavior

An axiomatic characterization of adaptive-liquidity market makers

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

Social learning and aggregate network uncertainty

Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions

Loss calibrated methods for bipartite rationing: bipartite rationing

Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty

Two-sided matching with partial information

Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

Cost function market makers for measurable spaces

House allocation with indifferences: a generalization and a unified view

Selection effects in online sharing: consequences for peer adoption

Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction

Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem

Latency arbitrage, market fragmentation, and efficiency: a two-market model

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective

Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games

Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Ashlagi, Itai Jaillet, Patrick Manshadi, Vahideh H.
Abstract	The need for kidney exchange arises when a healthy person wishes to donate a kidney but is incompatible with her intended recipient. Two main factors determine compatibility of a donor with a patient: blood-type compatibility and tissue-type compatibility. Two or more incompatible pairs can form a cyclic exchange so that each patient can receive a kidney from a compatible donor. In addition, an exchange can be initiated by a non-directed donor (an altruistic donor who does not designate a particular intended patient), and in this case, a chain of exchanges need not form a closed cycle. Current exchange pools are of moderate size and have a dynamic flavor as pairs enroll over time. Further, they contain many highly sensitized patients, i.e., patients that are very unlikely to be tissue-type compatible with a blood-type compatible donor. One major decision clearinghouses are facing is how often to search for allocations (a set of disjoint exchanges). On one hand, waiting for more pairs to arrive before finding allocations will increase the number of matched pairs, especially with highly sensitized patients, and on the other hand, waiting is costly. This paper studies this intrinsic tradeoff between the waiting time, and the number of pairs matched under a myopic, "current-like", matching algorithm called Chunk Matching (CM) that accumulates a given number of incompatible pairs, or a chunk, before searching for an allocation in the pool that consists of easy and hard to match patients. We perform sensitivity analysis on the chunk size given different types of allocations; first, we first study the performance of CM when it searches for allocations limited to cycles of length 2 and show that if the waiting period between two subsequent match runs is a sub-linear function of the problem size (or the entire time horizon), CM matches approximately the same number of pairs as the online scenario (matching each time a new incompatible pair joins the pool) does. Waiting, however, a linear fraction between every two runs will result in matching linearly more pairs compared to the online scenario. We then analyze CM when cycles of length both 2 and 3 are allowed. We show that for some regimes, sub-linear waiting will result in a linear addition of matches comparing to the online scenario. Finally, we study the efficiency of dynamic matching with chains (chains are initiated by a non-directed donor), and show that in the online scenario, adding one non-directed donor will increase linearly the number of matches that CM will find over the number of matches it will find without a chain. Our results may be of independent interest to the literature on dynamic matching in random graphs. Kidney exchange serves well as an example for which we have distributional information on the underlying graphs, thus we can exploit this information to make analysis and prediction far more accurate than the worst-case analysis can do. We believe our average-case analysis can have implications beyond the kidney exchange and can be applied to other dynamic allocation problems with such distributional information. Further, from a theoretical perspective, our paper initiates a novel direction in matching over time, deviating from the online scenarios. While this paper focuses on kidney exchange, there are many dynamic markets for barter exchange for which our findings apply. There is a growing number of websites that accommodate a marketplace for exchange of goods (often more than 2 goods), e.g. ReadItSwapIt.com and Swap.com. In these markets, the demand for goods, cycle lengths and waiting times play a significant role in efficiency.
Starting Page	25
Ending Page	26
Page Count	2
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450319621
DOI	10.1145/2482540.2482565
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2013-06-16
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Matching Market design
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Central Library (ISO-9001:2015 Certified)
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur
Kharagpur, West Bengal, India | PIN - 721302

See location in the Map
03222 282435
Mail: support@ndl.gov.in

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in