NDLI: You can promote, but you can't hide: large-scale abused app detection in mobile app stores

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You can promote, but you can't hide: large-scale abused app detection in mobile app stores

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Wang, Wenjing Xie, Zhen Zhu, Sencun Li, Qing
Abstract	Instead of improving their apps' quality, some developers hire a group of users (called collusive attackers) to post positive ratings and reviews irrespective of the actual app quality. In this work, we aim to expose the apps whose ratings have been manipulated (or abused) by collusive attackers. Specifically, we model the relations of raters and apps as biclique communities and propose four attack signatures to identify malicious communities, where the raters are collusive attackers and the apps are abused apps. We further design a linear-time search algorithm to enumerate such communities in an app store. Our system was implemented and initially run against Apple App Store of China on July 17, 2013. In 33 hours, our system examined 2, 188 apps, with the information of millions of reviews and reviewers downloaded on the fly. It reported 108 abused apps, among which 104 apps were confirmed to be abused. In a later time, we ran our tool against Apple App Stores of China, United Kingdom, and United States in a much larger scale. The evaluation results show that among the apps examined by our tool, abused apps account for 0.94%, 0.92%, and 0.57% out of all the analyzed apps, respectively in June 2013. In our latest checking on Oct. 15, 2015, these ratios decrease to 0.44%, 0.70%, and 0.42%, respectively. Our algorithm can greatly narrow down the suspect list from all apps (e.g., below 1% as shown in our paper). App store vendors may then use other information to do further verification.
Starting Page	374
Ending Page	385
Page Count	12
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450347716
DOI	10.1145/2991079.2991099
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2016-12-05
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	App store Abused apps Temporal biclique community Collusion attack
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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