NDLI: A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks

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A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks

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A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Bolot, Jean Lelarge, Marc
Abstract	Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general, to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Our goal in this paper is to model and investigate the impact of such externalities on security investments in a network. Specifically, we study a network of interconnected agents subject to epidemic risks such as viruses and worms where agents can decide whether or not to invest some amount to deploy security solutions. We consider both cases when the security solutions are strong (they perfectly protect the agents deploying them) and when they are weak. We make three contributions in the paper. First, we introduce a general model which combines an epidemic propagation model with an economic model for agents which captures network effects and externalities. Second, borrowing ideas and techniques used in statistical physics, we introduce a Local Mean Field (LMF) model, which extends the standard mean-field approximation to take into account the correlation structure on local neighborhoods. Third, we solve the LMF model in a network with externalities, and we derive analytic solutions for sparse random graphs of agents, for which we obtain asymptotic results. We find known phenomena such as free riders and tipping points. We also observe counter-intuitive phenomena, such as increasing the quality of the security technology can result in a decreased adoption of that technology in the network. In general, we find that both situations with strong and weak protection exhibit externalities and that the equilibrium is not socially optimal - therefore there is a market failure. Insurance is one mechanism to address this market failure. In related work, we have shown that insurance is a very effective mechanism [3,4], and argue that using insurance would increase the security in a network such as the Internet.
Starting Page	25
Ending Page	30
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781605581798
DOI	10.1145/1403027.1403034
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2008-08-22
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Economics Epidemics Tipping Free-rider problem Security Game theory Price of anarchy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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