NDLI: Network externalities and the deployment of security features and protocols in the internet

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Bolot, Jean Lelarge, Marc
Abstract	Getting new security features and protocols to be widely adopted and deployed in the Internet has been a continuing challenge. There are several reasons for this, in particular economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Indeed, like the Internet itself, the technologies to secure it exhibit network effects: their value to individual users changes as other users decide to adopt them or not. In particular, the benefits felt by early adopters of security solutions might fall significantly below the cost of adoption, making it difficult for those solutions to gain attraction and get deployed at a large scale. Our goal in this paper is to model and quantify the impact of such externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features and protocols in the Internet. We study a network of interconnected agents, which are subject to epidemic risks such as those caused by propagating viruses and worms, and which can decide whether or not to invest some amount to deploy security solutions. Agents experience negative externalities from other agents, as the risks faced by an agent depend not only on the choices of that agent (whether or not to invest in self-protection), but also on those of the other agents. Expectations about choices made by other agents then influence investments in self-protection, resulting in a possibly suboptimal outcome overall. We present and solve an analytical model where the agents are connected according to a variety of network topologies. Borrowing ideas and techniques used in statistical physics, we derive analytic solutions for sparse random graphs, for which we obtain asymptotic results. We show that we can explicitly identify the impact of network externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features. In other words, we identify both the economic and network properties that determine the adoption of security technologies. Therefore, we expect our results to provide useful guidance for the design of new economic mechanisms and for the development of network protocols likely to be deployed at a large scale.
Starting Page	37
Ending Page	48
Page Count	12
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01635999
DOI	10.1145/1384529.1375463
Journal	ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review (PERV)
Volume Number	36
Issue Number	1
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2014-01-10
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Economics Epidemics Cascading Security Game theory Price of anarchy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Networks and Communications Hardware and Architecture Software

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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