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Semi-invasive EM attack on FPGA RO PUFs and countermeasures
| Content Provider | ACM Digital Library |
|---|---|
| Author | Merli, Dominik Stumpf, Frederic Sigl, Georg Schuster, Dieter |
| Abstract | It is often argued that Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are resistant against invasive and semi-invasive attacks since these attacks would damage the underlying PUF structure resulting in a different PUF response. In this paper, we demonstrate exemplarily that this assumption does not hold for a Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF implemented on a Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA, where we were able to perform a semi-invasive attack. We present analysis methods to identify ring oscillator frequencies and to map them to their corresponding oscillators. We practically prove that it is possible to recover the generated RO PUF response bits with this approach. To harden RO PUFs against side-channel analysis, we also propose a RO PUF concept not leaking useful information through the side-channel of electro-magnetic radiation. |
| Starting Page | 1 |
| Ending Page | 9 |
| Page Count | 9 |
| File Format | |
| ISBN | 9781450308199 |
| DOI | 10.1145/2072274.2072276 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
| Publisher Date | 2011-10-09 |
| Publisher Place | New York |
| Access Restriction | Subscribed |
| Subject Keyword | Puf Sca Ring oscillator Side-channel analysis Fpga Electro magnetic analysis Semi-invasive attack Physical unclonable function Field programmable gate array |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
