NDLI: Slogger: Smashing Motion-based Touchstroke Logging with Transparent System Noise

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Slogger: Smashing Motion-based Touchstroke Logging with Transparent System Noise

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Mohamed, Manar Shrestha, Prakash Saxena, Nitesh
Abstract	Recent research shows that it is possible to infer a user's touchscreen inputs (e.g., passwords) on Android devices based on inertial (motion/position) sensors, currently freely-accessible by any Android app. Given the high accuracies of such touchstroke logging attacks, they are now considered a significant threat to user privacy. Consequently, the security community has started exploring defenses to such side channel attacks, but the suggested solutions are either not effective (e.g., those based on vibrational noise) and/or may significantly undermine system usability (e.g., those based on keyboard layout randomization). In this paper, we introduce a novel and practical defense to motion-based touchstroke leakage based on system-generated, fully automated and user-oblivious sensory noise. Our defense leverages a recently developed framework, SMASheD, that takes advantage of the Android's ADB functionality and can programmatically inject noise to various inertial sensors. Although SMASheD was originally advertised as a malicious app by its authors, we use it to build a defense mechanism, called Slogger ("Smashing the logger"), for defeating sensor-based touchstroke logging attacks. Slogger transparently inserts noisy sensor readings in the background as the user provides sensitive touchscreen input (e.g., password, PIN or credit card info) in order to obfuscate the original sensor readings. It can be installed in the user space without the need to root the device and to change the device's OS or kernel. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we introduce Slogger, identifying a novel, benign use case of SMASheD that can defeat touchstroke logging attacks. Second, we design and implement the Slogger app system that can be used to protect sensitive touchscreen input from leaking away. Third, we comprehensively evaluate Slogger against state-of-the-art touchstroke detection and inference attacks. Our results show that Slogger can significantly reduce the level of touchstroke leakage to the extent these attacks may become unworkable in practice, without affecting other benign apps. We also show that the leakage can be minimized even when attacks utilize a fusion of multiple motion-position sensors.
Starting Page	67
Ending Page	77
Page Count	11
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450342704
DOI	10.1145/2939918.2939924
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2016-07-18
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Side-channel attacks Mobile security Android
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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