NDLI: ANVIL:Software-Based Protection Against Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks (SIGP, Vol. 51, Issue. 4)

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Yitbarek, Salessawi Ferede Das, Reetuparna Oren, Yossi Aweke, Zelalem Birhanu Qiao, Rui Hicks, Matthew Austin, Todd
Abstract	Ensuring the integrity and security of the memory system is critical. Recent studies have shown serious security concerns due to "rowhammer" attacks, where repeated accesses to a row of memory cause bit flips in adjacent rows. Recent work by Google's Project Zero has shown how to leverage rowhammer-induced bit-flips as the basis for security exploits that include malicious code injection and memory privilege escalation. Being an important security concern, industry has attempted to defend against rowhammer attacks. Deployed defenses employ two strategies: (1) doubling the system DRAM refresh rate and (2) restricting access to the CLFLUSH instruction that attackers use to bypass the cache to increase memory access frequency (i.e., the rate of rowhammering). We demonstrate that such defenses are inadequte: we implement rowhammer attacks that both avoid using the CLFLUSH instruction and cause bit flips with a doubled refresh rate. Our next-generation CLFLUSH-free rowhammer attack bypasses the cache by manipulating cache replacement state to allow frequent misses out of the last-level cache to DRAM rows of our choosing. To protect existing systems from more advanced rowhammer attacks, we develop a software-based defense, ANVIL, which thwarts all known rowhammer attacks on existing systems. ANVIL detects rowhammer attacks by tracking the locality of DRAM accesses using existing hardware performance counters. Our detector identifies the rows being frequently accessed (i.e., the aggressors), then selectively refreshes the nearby victim rows to prevent hammering. Experiments running on real hardware with the SPEC2006 benchmarks show that ANVIL has less than a 1% false positive rate and an average slowdown of 1%. ANVIL is low-cost and robust, and our experiments indicate that it is an effective approach for protecting existing and future systems from even advanced rowhammer attacks.
Starting Page	743
Ending Page	755
Page Count	13
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03621340 15581160
DOI	10.1145/2954679.2872390
Journal	ACM SIGPLAN Notices (SIGP)
Volume Number	51
Issue Number	4
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	1983-05-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Bit-plru Rowhammer Clflush Intel pebs Dram Disturbance errors Performance counters Kernel module
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design Software

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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ANVIL:Software-Based Protection Against Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks (SIGP, Vol. 51, Issue. 4)

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ANVIL:Software-Based Protection Against Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks (SIGP, Vol. 51, Issue. 4)