NDLI: Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity

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Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Schrijvers, Okke Roughgarden, Tim
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	We consider network cost-sharing games with nonanonymous cost functions, where the cost of each edge is a submodular function of its users, and this cost is shared using the Shapley value. Nonanonymous cost functions model asymmetries between the players, which can arise from different bandwidth requirements, durations of use, services needed, and so on. These games can possess multiple Nash equilibria of wildly varying quality. The goal of this article is to identify well-motivated equilibrium refinements that admit good worst-case approximation bounds. Our primary results are tight bounds on the cost of strong Nash equilibria and potential function minimizers in network cost-sharing games with nonanonymous cost functions, parameterized by the set $\textit{C}$ of allowable submodular cost functions. These two worst-case bounds coincide for every set $\textit{C},$ and equal the $\textit{summability}$ parameter introduced in Roughgarden and Sundararajan [2009] to characterize efficiency loss in a family of cost-sharing mechanisms. Thus, a single parameter simultaneously governs the worst-case inefficiency of network cost-sharing games (in two incomparable senses) and cost-sharing mechanisms. This parameter is always at most the $\textit{k}th$ Harmonic number $H_{k}$ ≈ ln $\textit{k},$ where $\textit{k}$ is the number of players, and is constant for many function classes of interest.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	24
Page Count	24
File Format	PDF
ISSN	21678375
e-ISSN	21678383
DOI	10.1145/2841228
Volume Number	4
Issue Number	2
Journal	ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2016-02-03
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Network cost-sharing games Equilibrium refinement Potential function minimizer Strong Nash equilibria Summability
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Marketing Computational Mathematics Statistics and Probability Computer Science

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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