NDLI: The Price of Uncertainty

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The Price of Uncertainty

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Mansour, Yishay Blum, Avrim Balcan, Maria-Florina
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	In this work, we study the degree to which small fluctuations in costs in well-studied potential games can impact the result of natural best-response and improved-response dynamics. We call this the Price of Uncertainty and study it in a wide variety of potential games including fair cost-sharing games, set-cover games, routing games, and job-scheduling games. We show that in certain cases, even extremely small fluctuations can have the ability to cause these dynamics to spin out of control and move to states of much higher social cost, whereas in other cases these dynamics are much more stable even to large degrees of fluctuation. We also consider the resilience of these dynamics to a small number of Byzantine players about which no assumptions are made. We show again a contrast between different games. In certain cases (e.g., fair cost-sharing, set-cover, job-scheduling) even a single Byzantine player can cause best-response dynamics to transition from low-cost states to states of substantially higher cost, whereas in others (e.g., the class of $\textit{β}-nice$ games, which includes routing, market-sharing and many others) these dynamics are much more resilient. Overall, our work can be viewed as analyzing the inherent resilience or $\textit{safety}$ of games to different kinds of imperfections in player behavior, player information, or in modeling assumptions made.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	29
Page Count	29
File Format	PDF
ISSN	21678375
e-ISSN	21678383
DOI	10.1145/2509413.2509415
Volume Number	1
Issue Number	3
Journal	ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2013-09-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Game theory Best-response dynamics Potential games Quality of equilibria Social cost Uncertainty
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Marketing Computational Mathematics Statistics and Probability Computer Science

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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