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West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950), Ss. 3, 5—Constitution of India, Art. 14 - Act constituting special courts and empowering State Government to refer “cases” or “offences” or “classes of cases” or “classes of offences” to such Court—Constitutional validity —Fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws—Construction of Act—Reference to preamble—Act not classifying cases or laying down standard for classification—Intention of legislature how far material—Validity of notification under Act—Test of equality before law—Essentials of reasonable classification—Necessity of speedier trial, whether reasonable ground for discrimination. The West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950) was entitled “An Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences,” and the object of the Act, as declared in the preamble, was “to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences”. Section 3 of the Act empowered the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts, and sec. 5 provided that “A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.” The Act laid down a procedure for trial before Special Courts which was different in several respects from that laid down by the Criminal Procedure Code for trial of offences generally. ‘The respondent, who was convicted by a Special Court which tried his case under a notification issued by the Government under sec, 5, contended ‘that the said section was unconstitutional and void inasmuch as it contravened Art, 14 of the Constitution, which provides that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India” :Held: Per Fazal Ali, Mahajan, Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Bose JJ. (Patanjali Shastri C. J., dissenting)—Section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, contravenes Art, 14 of the Constitution and is void inasmuch as (per Fazal Ali, Mahajan, Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.) the procedure laid down by the Act for the trial by the Special Courts varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act did not classify, or lay down any basis for classification, of the cases which may be directed to be tried by the Special Court, but left it to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court. Das J.—Section 5 (1)of the Act, in so far as it empowered the State Government to direct “offences” or “classes of offences” or “classes of cases” to be tried by a Special Court, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government but by necessary implication contemplates a proper classification and is not void. That part of the section which empowered the Government to direct “cases” as distinct from “classes of cases” to be tried by a Special Court is void. Patanjali Shastri C, J.—Section 5 (1) of the Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part. Per Fazal Ali, Mahajan, Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. — A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Art. 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination.(ii) If it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of legislation and denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position, it is not incumbent upon him before he can claim relief on the basis of fundamental rights to assert and prove that, in making the law, the legislature was actuated by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular person or class; nor would the operation of Art. 14 be excluded merely because it is proved that the legislature had no intention to discriminate, though discrimination was the necessary consequence of the Act. The question of intention may arise in ascertaining whether an officer acted mala-fide ‘or not; but it cannot arise when discrimination follows or arises on the express terms of the law itself, (iii) The language of sec. 5 (1) clearly and unambiguously vests the State Government with unrestricted discretion to direct any cases or class of cases to be tried by the Special Court, not a discretion to refer cases only when it is of opinion that a speedier trial is necessary.(iv) Assuming that the preamble throws any light on the section, the necessity of speedier trial is too vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a rational basis for discrimination.(v) It cannot be said that an Act does not contravene the equality rule laid down by Art. 14 simply because it confers unregulated discretion on officers or administrative bodies. The true position is that if the statute itself is not discriminatory the charge of violation of the article may be only against the official who administers it, but if the statute itself makes a discrimination without any proper or reasonable basis, it would be void for being in conflict with Art. 14. ,(vi) The notification issued under the Act in the present case would also come within the definition of law and could be impeached apart from the Act if it violates Art. 14,Das J.-—(1) Article 14 does not insist that every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does not take away from the State the power to classify persons for the purposes of legislation, but the classification must be rational, and in order to satisfy this test (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguished those that are grouped together from others, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. But the- mere fact that the inequality has not been made with the special intention of prejudicing a particular person or persons but in the general interest of administration will not validate a law if in fact it results in inequality of treatment. Nor can the constitutionality of a statute depend on the degree of the inequality brought about by the law. . .(2) Although the preamble to an Act cannot override the plain meaning of its operative parts, it may nevertheless assist in ascertaining what the true meaning or implication of a particular section’ is; and the part of sec.5 (1) of the Act which relates to “offences”, “classes of offences” and “classes of cases”, construed in the light of the preamble, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government, but by necessary implication and intendment empowers the State to classify the offences or classes of offences or classes of cases, that is to say, to make a proper classification having a relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble; and this part of sec. 5(1) does not therefore contravene Art. 14. (3) That part of sec. 5(1) which empowers the State Government to direct “cases” as distinct from “classes of cases” to be tried by the Special Court lies beyond the ambit of the object laid down by the preamble and contemplates and involves a purely arbitrary selection based on nothing more — substantial than the whim and pleasure of the State Government without any appreciable relation to the necessity for a speedier trial and therefore offends against the provisions of Art. 14 and is void. Bose J—The test under Art. 14 is neither classification nor whether there is absolute equality in any academical sense of the term but whether the collective conscience of a sovereign democratic republic as reflected in the views of fair-minded, reasonable, unbiased men, who are not swayed by emotion or _ prejudice, can consider the impugned laws as reasonable, just and fair and regard them as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the conditions which obtain in India today. Patanjali Shastri C.J. (dissenting)—Section 5(1) of the impugned Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part because: (1) The words in the enacting part of a statute must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act and the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was. The title and the preamble of the Act in the present case show unmistakable- ably that the whole object and purpose of the Act was to devise machinery for the speedier trial of certain offences. The discre- tion intended to. be exercised by the State Government must be exercised bona fide on a consideration of the special features or circumstances which call for comparatively prompt disposal of a case or cases proposed to be referred and sec. 5(1) must be read as empowering the Government to direct the Special Court to try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases. as in its judgment, require speedier trial. (2) Article 14 of the Constitution docs not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application. The State must possess. the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to particular laws and in making a classification the legislature must be allowed a wide latitude of discretion and’ judgment. The classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary but is founded on a reasonable basis having regard to the object to be attained. (3) The powers of the legislature must include the power of entrusting an administrative body with a plenary but not arbitrary discretion to be exercised so as to carry out the purpose of the Act and the mere fact that the discretion might be exercised arbitrarily by the administrative: body cannot make the law itself unconstitutional. (4) The impugned Act does not in terms or by implication discriminate between: persons or classes of persons nor does it purport to deny to any one equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. (5): Even from the point of view of reasonable classification the ex- expediency of speedier trial is not too vague or indefinite to be the Basis of classification. (6) The notification of the Government in the present case referring the case to the Special Court did not contravene Art. 14 and is not void inasmuch as there is nothing to show that the Government was influenced by any discriminatory motive or design or acted arbitrarily, but on the other hand there are obviously special features which mark off the group of cases referred as requiring speedier disposal. Judgment of the Calcutta High court has been affirmed. |
