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A B D .E F G H 623: LAKSHMI~TAN COTTON MILLS CO .. LTD. v. ALUMINIUMCORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. October 16, 1970 [J. M. SHELAT AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JI.] LimitationAct. 1908, s. 19(1)-Acknowledgment of liability-What· amounts to--AuthoriFy to make •cknow/edgment 011 behalf of corporation, when can be implied. Prior toJanuary)8, 1944 six companies including M/s. Lakshmifataa.. Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. (the appellant-company)and the Aluminium Cor·· porationof IndiaLtd. (respondentcorporation) were jointly managed by two groups known as the Singhaniaand Guptagroups. As a result ofdisputes.betweenthe two groups there was a referenceto arbitratien. AfterJanuary 18, 1944, the dateof the award,the aforesaid six· concerns. were broughtunder the management and controlof one or theother ofthe two groupg. The Cn amountedto anacknowledgment; (!!) whether 1t was an acknawled~ment by the corpomion, andif not (1u) whether theSecretary-cum-ChiefAccountant had authorityexpress orimplied,to acknowledgeliability on behalf of theCorporationso as. to bindthat corporation. Allowing the appeals, · HELD: (!)(a) From the provisionsof s. 19(1) Of the Limilation• Act, 1908 it is clearthat the statementon which the pleaof acknowledge meat is foundedmust relateto a subsistingliability as the sectionrequires. •624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 S.C.R. .that it must be madebeforethe expirationof theperiodprescribed by the Act. It need not,however,amount to a promiseto pay, for' an acknowledge mentdoes not createa new right of actionbut merely exteno appears tohavebeen madeeitherin theTrialCourtor the High Court wherethe controversy was centeredaround the questionwhether thesaidlettercontained an acknowledgementand whether its writer,addressingit onbehalfof the corporation,had the authority tomakesuch an acknowledgementbinding on thecorporation. In our view Mr.Guptecould not, at such a belatedstage, raise for the first time thepleathat it was the corporationwhich through thesaidlettermadethe acknowledgement and that we should understandthat Jetter to meansuch an acknowledgement by the corporation itself. The questim1, therefore,that really arises for our determina tion is whetherthe saidlettercontains an acknowledgement,which itswriter,Subramanyam,had the authority, express or implied, tomake.Even that question gets reducedin extentand scope as it was neverthe caseof theappellant-companyat anystage thatthe corporationhad clothed its Secretarywith suchauthority expressly.Such a case Mr. Guptedid not makeout evenbefore us and proceededin factto arguethat the ,,vidence on record showedthat he had suchauthority given to him impliedly. Sec. 19(1) of the LimitationAct, 1908 provides that where, beforetheexpiration of the period prescribedfor a suitin res pectof anypropertyor right, · anacknowledgement of liability inrespectof suchpropertyor right has beenmadein writing signed by thepartyagainst whom such propertyor right is claim ed,a freshperiodof limitationshall be computedfrom the time A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS v. ALUMIN!UM CORP. 629 (She!r.t, J.) when the acknowledgement was so signed. Theexpression 'signect·· heremeansnot onlysignedpersonallyby sucha party,but also by an agentduly authorisedin thatbehalf.Explanation 1 to thesectionthen providesthat an acknowledgementwould be sufficientthough it omitsto specifythe exactnatureof the pro pertyor right, or aversthat the timefor paymenthas not yet come, or is accompanied by arefusal to pay or is coupled witha claim to a set-off,or is addressedto a person other than thepersonentitledto thepropertyor right.The newAct of 1963 containsin s. 18 substantiallysimilar provisions. It is clear that the statementon whichthe plea oi acknow ledgement is foundedmust relate to a subsistingliability as the sectionrequiresthat it must be madebeforethe expirationof theperiodprescribedunder the Act. It neednot, however, amountto a promise to pay,for, an acknowledgementdoes not createa newrightto actionbut merelyextendsthe periodof limitation.The statementneed notindicatethe exactnature or the specific characterof theliability.The wordsused in the statement in question,however, must relat<' to a presentsub sistingliabilityand indicatethe existenceof jura!relationship betweenthe parties,such as, forinstance,that of a debtorand a creditor,and the intentionto admitsuch juralrelationship. Such an intentionneed not be in express tem1s andcan be in ferredby implicationfrom the natureof theadmissionand the surroundingcircumstances.Generally speaking, a liberalcon structionof thestatementin questionshould be given. That of-coursedoes not meanthat wherea statement is made with outintendingto admitthe existenceof juralrelationship,such intentionshould be fastenedon thepersonmakingthe statement byaninvolvedand far-fetchedreasoning. (see Khan Bahadw· 'iihapoor FredoomMazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria(')and Ti/ak Ram v. Nathu(2). As Fry, L.J.,in Green v. Humphreys(") said "an acknowledgement is anadmissionby thewriterthat there is adebtowingby himeitherto the receiverof theletter or to someotherperson on whosebehalf the letter is received but it is •not enoughthat he refersto a debt as beingdue from somebody. In orderto takethe caseout of thestatutethere mu~t upon the fairconstructionof theletter,read in thelight ofthesurroundingcircumstances,be anadmissionthat the writer owesthe debt." As alreadystated, the personmakingthe acknowledgementcan be boththe debtorhimself as also a person duly authorisedby himto makethe admission. In Khan Ba/wdur (I) (1962)1 S. C.R. 140. (21 A.LR. 1967 S. C. 935. at 938. 9)9 (3) (1884) 26 Ch. D. 474 at 481. 13-L436 Sup C l/71 630 SUPJlEME COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 S.C.R. Sliapoor Fredoom Mazda's case( 1 ) theCourt accepted a state mentin a Jetterby a bortgago.11 to a secondmortgageeto save the mortgagedproperty from beingsold away at a cheapprice at the instanceof thepriormortgageeby himselfpurchasing it as oneamountingto an admission of thejuralrelationship of a mortgagorand mortgagee,and therefore,to an acknowledge ment within s. 19. Also, an agreement of referenceto arbitra tioncontaining an unqualifiedadmission that whoeveron account sheuld beprovedto be the debtorwould pay ta the otherhas beenheld to amountto anacknowledgement.Such an admission isnotsubjectto theconditionthat beforethe agreementshould operateas anacknowledgement,the liabilitymust be ascertained bythearbitrator. · Theacknowledgementoperates whether the arbitratoracts or not. (see Tejpa/Saraogi v. Lallanjee Jain(~, approving Abdul Rahim Gosman & Co. v. Ojamshee Prushottam das & Co.( 3). The letter(Ex. 1) relied on as an acknowledgement was writtento theappellant-companyby Subramanayamsigning it "for Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd." It consists of several paragraphsdealing with diverseitems relating ·to differentamounts claimedby theappellant-companyin a statement of claimpre viouslysent by it tothecorporation, some of whichare refuted by thewriter,while the othersare accepted.The penultimate ·paragraph, which is said to containthe admission,reads as follows: "After alltheaboveadjustments,the position will be as perstlitement attached. ·Interest has beenpro videdon somebalancesand on othersit hasnot been provided.We requestyou to confirm the balance of Rs. 1,07,477-13-11, so that we may proceedwith the calculationof interestand settleyour claim once and forall immediately. Kindlyacknowledgethis letterand favour us with an immediate reply." The Jetterspeaks in the last sentence of a copy of it to besent to LalaPurshottamDasji Singhania "for information"The copy -of the letter,as is clear fromthe other evidence· as also the words "for information"was not sentfor approvaland was obviously not intended to be subjectto suchapprovalby Pnm shottam Singhania.The. statementenclosed with the letter is 1'eaded"Account of M/s. LakshmiratanCotton Mills Co. Ltd." .and first sets out tl!e balanceof Rs. 1,00,760-0-7 in favourof (I) (1962) I. S. C. R. 140. (1) C.A. No. 766 of 1962, decided. on Feb. 8, 1965. (3) (1928) I. L R.56 Cal. 639. A B c D E F G H A B LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS v. ALUMINIUM CORP, 631 (Shelot, 1.) the appellant-company "as perour ledger", meaningthe ledger ofthe corporation,;ind the first foot-note·thereto states thatthat amountincluded interest .. of Rs. 26,490-11-10 calculated up_to March 31, 1943.Severalamountsdue to otherconcerns pay able to or by theappellant-company are thenadjustedand final- ly the balanceis _struck at Rs.· 1,07,447-13-11(which is the onementionedin the letter (Ex. 1) which if confirmed by the appellant-company,the corporationwould "settle your clainI once and for all imniediately." The High Co.urt, as .aforesaid; :held,contraryto the view of theTrialCourt, .. that thiseletter was only "explanatory" and was c nelot !ntenhi~eqbe· to 'tie· a.uth adnii~si Rs. 1,96,556-13-8" Thenfolloweddetailed items claimedby thecorporation total lingRs. 1,96,556-13-8.The statementreferred to abovewas theoneunder. whichthe appellant-companyclaimed Rs. 2,94,658:0-9 and· )l!hich was sent earlierin March1945 by RamRatan Gupta' to Purushottam Singhania.. Thecorporation tookobjectionto it byclaimingvarious amoi,mts and against which,accordingto thecorporation,only a sumof Rs. 98,101-3-1 was payableby it "as per AC.I. Ltd. Books", that is to say, as shownby the books of accountmaintainedby thecorporation.The replyof theappellant-company,dated December6, 1945, to the A B c D E F G H A B c D F G LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS V. ALUMINIUM CORP. 633 (She/at, J.) of theappellant-company,dated December6, 1945, to the afore aforesaidJetter of September17, 1945 and the statementenclosed theretoshows that the saidAroraon behalfof the appellant companyand the saidSubramanayamon behalfof the corpora tionmet and triedto reconcilethe accounts.The appellant company by thisreplyalso sent particularsof certainitems ap parentlycalled for by Subramanayam at thatmeetingand in its tum askedfor particulars of certainitems debitedto it in the saidreconciliationstatement. On December 21, 1945, Subra manayamreplied to theappellant-company'sletter of December 6,1945.By thatletterhe conveyedtwo thing~, (1) that in respectof certainitems claimedby theappellant-companyand whichwere disputed,those itemswere eitherpassedor disallowed, and (2) thatsincethe appellant-companyhad combined in its statementof claimaccounts of other alliedconcernsalso, he too hadcombinedthose accountswhile preparingthe statementof accountshe wassendingalong with his letter.The letter con cludedby stating: "we herewithenclose a consolidated state mentafter mergingall these accounts." Theconsolidated state ment, (Ex. 44) enclosed JY Subramanayam withliis reply,reads as follows: "Accounts of MessrsLakshmiratanCotton Mills Co. Ltd. 1945 December 1. By balance as per ourledger Rs. I,00,304-7-7" Thenfollowaccountsof otherconcernswhose accountswere broughtin in whatSubramanayamcalled the consolidated state mentof account.This statementreflected the positionof the appellant-companyin thecorporation'sbooks of account•; as on December 1, 1945. It will be noticedthat the amountadmitted in the st~itc ment by thecorporation as due to the appellant-company wsc fromRs. 98,000 and odd (as per the earlier statement. dated September 17, 1945) to Rs. 1,00,304- 7-7. This increase was dueto thefactthat,whileadjustingthe disputed ile111;. Subra manayamhad allowedand ''passed" some o[ them bct11ccn Sep temberand December1945 when the disputeditems 11erc di> cussed and adjusted, anJ ~ntrics relating to tho~c hii.:h ''~:.' passed were posted to the credit of th.~ appcllanh:nmpany in 1he booksof the corporation. .Theletter of December 21. I '-J.+.; as replied tn by tile ctppe, tant-company nn l'cbructry :~. ! 9.i6 hy u'king pe1nin11'ir' :;1 634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 S.C.R. respectof itemclaimedby Subramanayaniin hissaidletter. It was in answerto thisletterthat Subramanayamwrote the letter· (Ex. 1) in controversyand withwhichhe sentthe statement show ingRs.1,07,447-13-11 as "Balance carried down". Correspondencecontinued thereafter between the parties, the appe!lantcompany maintainingthat a muchlargeramountwas dueto it thanthe sumof Rs. 1,07,447-13-11. Exceptthat, .the latercorrespondencewould not throw any lighton thequestion as to acknowledgement,and therefore, we neednow detain our selveson it. A B Leavingaside for. the tiinei beingthe question as to Subra· c manayam'sauthority, the followingfacts emergefrom the corres pondence ·and the statementsof accountsaccompanyingsome of theletterssent on behalfof thecorporation: (a) In pursuance of cl. ( 9) of the ·said award, the appellant-companysent to thecorporation · in thebeginningof March1945 a stateme.nt qf D accountclaimingRs. 2,94,000 and odd as due toit. (b) Atno time.duringthe Jengtny correspondenct whichensuedbetweenthe parties,the corpora- tion deniedits liabilityto pay;whatit did waE todisputethe correctnessof theamount claim ed bytheappellant-companyby challenging certainitems for whichthe appellant-company claimedcredit and by makingcertain counter claimsof its own. · As againstthe statement of accountsent by theappellant-conipany,the cor poration sent its own statementwhich . itcalled the'reconciliatfonaccount'. ( c) Duringthe processof adjustmentand reconci liation of theseveralitems claimedby the appellllillt -company some wereallowedand some wererejected,and the corporationsought to debit certainitems claimedby it againstthe appellant-company. (d) Accordingto the f!lCOnciliation statement sent . bythecorporationon September17, 1945 onlyRs. 98,000 and oddwasdue to the appel lant-company as againstits claimfor Rs. 2,94,000 andodd.Later,this · figure was raisedfrom time to tiine as someof . the -items claimedby theappellant-companywere allowed E F H LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS V. ALUMINIUMCORP. 635 • (Shelat, J.) •• wnn the resultthat in thestatementsent along withthe letter(Ex. 1) the balancedue to the appellant-company was shownat Rs. 1,07,447. B c D F G H (e) The statementsof accounts,(Exs. 43 and 44) and the oneenclosedwith the letter,(Ex. 1) in cleartermsstatedthat the--balances s~n thereinwere as shown in theledgermaintain ed by the corporation.The lettersequally clearlystated that intereston suchbalanceswas beingcreditedup to certain dates and for the furtherperiod wouldbe creditedwhen the accountswere finalised. Itmustfollowfrom thesefacts that there was a subsisting accountin thenameof theappellant·companyin thebooksof thecorporationin whichintereston thebalanceshown therein fromtime to time was beingcreditedandin whichamountsin respectof itemspassedduring the courseof reconciliationwere alsobeingcredited.The statement in the letter(Ex. 1) that "after all theaboveadjustmentsthe positionwill be as per state· ment attached", that is tosay,that there was a balanceof Rs. 1,07,447·13·11 dueand payable to theappel!ant-company,must clearlyamountto an a~knowiedgement withinthe meaning of', - s. 19(1). In ourviewif theletter(Ex. 1) were to belooked atinthebackgroundof thecontroversybetween the parties, which controversy was, as aforesaid,limited to thequestion as to thecorrectnessof theamountclaimedby theappellant-company asalsothe correspondencewhich ensuedin regardto it, itwouldbe impossibleto saythatthe letter(Ex. 1) and the statementof accountenclosedtherewithwere merelyexplanatory and dicl notamountto anadmission'of thejuralrelationship ofdebtorand creditorand of theliabilityto paytheamount founddue at thefootof theaccounton finalisation. Butthe argumentwas that sincethe letter(Ex. 1) called forconfirmationof tile amount of Rs. 1,07,447 as being the balancedue to theappellant-companyand as theappellant com· paoyfailedto confirmit, theadmissionof -liability was condi· tional, and :herefore, cannotoperate as an acknowledgement. In this connection the decision in Maniram v. Rupchllnd( 1 ) was relied on andin particular the famousdictum of Mellish, L.I., in bl, re_ River Steamer Co. v. Mltc.he/1( 9 ) ·approvinglycited therein.The dictum was thai an acknowledgementto takethe caseout cf the statute of limitationmust be either one from which· anabsolutepromise to pay can be inferred,or secondly,an (I) LR. 33 I. A. 16S. (2) L. R. 6 Ch. App. ~22, •t 828. 636 SUPRH!E COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 S.C.R. unconditionalpromise to pay the specific debt,or thirdly,that there must be aconditionalpromise to paythe debtand evidence thatthe conditionhas been performed.The statement rflied on in Maniram's case( 1 ) as anacknowledgement was bythe res pondent in a writtenstatement filed by him in anearlierpro bateproceeding in which it was averredthat the applicantRup chandNanabhai(the respondent) "had for the last five years openand currentaccountswith the deceased(the testator) and1 thatthe allegedindebtednessdid notaffect .his right to apply for probate", as one of theexecutors.It was held that the state ment was sufficient to constitutean acknowledgement. "An unconditional acknowledgement", saidtheirLordships, ''has always been held to implya promise to pay,becausethat is the naturalinference if nothing is said to the contrary. It is whatevery hone3t man wouldmean to do Therecan be no reasonfor giving a differentmeaning to an acknowledgement thatthere is a right to havethe accountssettled, and no quali fication of thenaturalinferencethat whoever is the creditor shallbe paid when thecondition is performed by the ascertain mentof a balance in favour of the claimant. It is a case of the thirdproportion of Mellish. L.J ., a conditionalpromise to pay andthe condition performed." We do not see how this decision cansupportthe corporationsince in the presentcase also there was an admissionof a subsistingaccount on the finalisationof which the corporation was preparedto paythe balan~e found dueat the footthereof.The onlydispute was whatwouldbe such as balance. Rs. 1,07,447, according to thecorporation, and a larger sum according to theappellant-company. The con firmationsought for in the letter (Ex.1) was not a condition totheadmission as to theexistence of a subsistingaccount and theliability to pay when accounts were finalised,but to the specific amount which, according to the corporation, would be theamountpayable by it according to its calculation.The decision in RajaKavaliArunachellaRow Bahadur v. Sri Rajalt Rang/ah App RowBahadur(") does not apply· as the condition subject to which thesettlementthere was made was not perform ed, andtherefore.the document was held to be one which could notbe speltout as an acknowledgement. In Ral/apragada Ru11111- m11rthy v. ,Thammana Gopay,va(")' also, the letterrelied on as an acknowledgementstated that if certainarbitratorsshould de cide that the defendantshould pay any amount he "otild immediatelypay but if the arbitratorsfailed to decide the plain tiff mipht .su.; and thedefendant in that case wouldnot ;ikad limitation.The arbitratorsfailed to decide. It was held that · the letterbeingconditionaland the conditionnot having been rl) L. R. J3 IA. 165. I'.!) [1906] T. L. R. '.!9 Mad. 51'1. 13/ [1917] T. L. R 40 Mad. 701. A B c D E G II A B c D E F G H LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS V. ALUMINIUM CORP. 637 (She/at, J.) performed did notoperate as an acknowledgement.This deci sion too has no bearing on the factsof thepresentcase. Unlike the cases relied on byMr.Sen,the presentcase is one of an admissionof a subsistingaccount and the juralrelationshipand theliabilityto paywhateveramount would be founddue on finalisationof accounts.There is no conditionsubject to which theadmission was madewhichremainedunperformed. Ordinarily, the functionsof · Subramainym as thesecretary ofthecorporationwould be ministerial and administrative.As asecretaryonly, he wouldhave no authorityto bindthe corpo rationby enteringinto contracts or othercommitments on 'its behalf.As thechiefaccountantand holder oi a powerof attorney, hisfunctionsin regardto theformerwould be to superviseover maintenanceof properaccounts,and in regardto thelatterto lookafterand representthe corporationin litigation.None of thesethree positionsheld by himwouldby itselfor cumulatively makehim a personduly authorisedto mak.e an acknowledge ment binding on the corporation.Also, the factthat he carried on correspondencefor thecorporationwould not makehim a· personauthorisedto makean acknowledgementbinding on the corporation.[see Uma Shankar v. GobindNarain(1)]. jlut such adescriptionof thefunctionsand dutiesperformedby himwould notbe compleie. If thecorrespondencetogether with the state mentsof accountsencolsed therewithis closelyexamined it be- · comes clear that he wasauthorisedto scrutinisethe claimmade bytheappellant-company,the variousitems for whichthe appel lant-companyclaimed credit aind to rejectsome,and what is important,to allowthe others. That he hadsuchan authority is clearfromthe factthat in respectof suchof theitemswhich heallowedcredit was givento theappellant-companyand neces sary entriesto thecreditof theappellant-companywere posted intheaccountmaintainedby thecorporationin itsbooksof account.Thus, in thereconciliationstatement (Ex. 43) sent alongwith thecorporation'sletter of September17, 1945.Rs. 98,101 were shownto bethebalancedue to the appellant company.The wordsused in thatstatementwere "balance as per AC.I. Ltd. Books". These wordsclearlyindicatethat there wasa subsistingaccount in the nameof theappellant-company in th~ booksof thecorporationand thatat thefootof that accountthe sumof Rs: 98,101 was dueto it.Ex.44. another statementof accountsent to theappellant-company,stated Rs. 1,00,304-7-7 as being the "Balance as per ledger" as on December 1, 1945.As explainedearlier, the increase in thebalancefrom Rs. 98,101 to Rs._ 100,304 wasdue to certainitems aggregating Rs3203~4-6 ~~~~n_g b:en passedby Subramanayam,and entries (!)I. L. R. 46 All. 892.-· 6.38 5UPREME COURT REPORTS [1971) 2 S.C.R. having thereuponbeen postedin theledger.Thereafter,further items were passc~ by him totallingRs. 465-10-0 which when added raised the balance to Rs. 1,00,760-1-7, as at tlie end of December 1945. This was thebalance "as perour ledger" statedin thestatementsent alongwith the letter(Ex. 1). It is impossibleto thinkthat in thecourseof finalisingthe accounts Subramanaylm accorded his assent to . var/ousitems claimedby theappelfant-companywithout having peen autho rised so to do.Nor is it possible to say thaton hispassingthose itemsnecessaryentries were madein thebooksof accounts ofthecorporation without his havingso authorised.Further, hecouldnot havesent to the appellant-companystatements of accountsshowing the balance due to it "as perthe ledger" unlesshe wasauthorised 'lo finalisethe accountsand arrive ··:at the amountdue .and payableto the appe!lantcompaµy. In hisevidenceSubramanayam testifi~ that Lakshmipat Singhania,the director-in-charge of the cow_oration, knew 1 that _hewasdealingwith Arora,the representativeof the apNPant --company,in thematterof accountsbetween the parties. ~ also saidthat he was to findout the differencebetween tile two and 'that as a resultmany points were resolved an he con firmedby lettersto theappellantcompany th0se points which wereso resolved. Re thenstatedthat the directorsof the cor porationwere awareof thesettlementof thesaidpoints- by him buttheyneitherratifiednor repudiatedthem.- "This'i.ias because, as conceded by him, be neverplacedthose settledpoints before thedirectorsfor theirratification.He didnotsay thathe had _no authorityto settlethe differencesor thathe settledthem sub- jectto theapprovalof the directors. It is clearthat he could. not havesettledthe variouspoints of differencebetween the parties andsuitableentries in thebooksconsequentupon such settle mentcouldnot havebeen postedunlesshewas authorisedby thedirectors to finalisethe account& and make final adjustment withthe appellant-company.He tried,of course,to makeout thathe hadno authorityexcept as a secretaryto carryon cor respondencefor clarifyingthe positionof thecorporation.He evendeniedthat entrieswere madein thebooksof thecorpora tionafterhe hadsettledthe saiditems.The denial is futile because.the statementsof accoµntsent by himto the appellan companyfrom time to time clearlyshow that suchentrieswere made.The effect of all this.evidence is that.besideshis functions asthesecretary-cum-chiefaccountant, he _was authorised to finalise the. accountsbetween the p_arties, to settle differences betweenthem and to arrive at thefinalfigurepayableby the corporation. It was inpursuanceof suchauthoritythat he dealtwith Arora,passed some of theitemsfor whichthe A 8 c D E F G H A B c D E LAKSHMIRATAN COTTON MILLS 1'. ALUMINIUM CORP. 639 (Shelat, I.) appellant-companyclaimed credit, had thoseentriesposted in the books of the corporation,sent statementsof accountsfrom time to time and finally addressedthe letter,(Ex. I); stafingthere in thataccording to the booksof thecorporationthe sumof Rs. 1,07,447 was the balancepayable to the appellant-company. He couldnot possiblyhave askedthe appellant-companyto con firm that balance unless he had the authorityon behalfof the corporation to acknowledgeon itsbehalfthat that was the balance payabLe by it.Therefore,the conclusion is inescapable thathe had the impliedauthority to niake the acknowledgement andwrotethe letter(Ex. I) with the intentionof doing so. Accordingly, the suits werenot liable to be dismissedon thegroundof theirbeingbarred by limitation,and the High Court was inerrorin allowingthe appeals by the corporation and dismissing the suits. Theresult is that the appealsare allowed,and the judgment and order passed by theHighCourtare set aside. The ~ase will have to be remandedto theHighCourtfor decidingthe rest of the questionsarising in the suits and ascertaining the amountsdue totheappellants(the originalplaintiffs) as the HighCourthas notgoneinto thosequestions as it dismissedthe suitson the pointof limitation.· In view of the very longperiodhavingelapsed due.to prolongedadjournments of the appeals while they were pendmg .bef~re the HighCourt,we ea~e~tly hope that the High Court w!ll dispose of the cases as expediitously as possible. The corporation will pay to theappellants costs of theseappeals,such costs to be inoneset of costs. G.C. Appeals allowed. |
