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A B '''".; -- DHARMESH @ NANU NITINBHAI SHAH v. STATE OF GUJARAT ; AUGUST I, 2002 - .. . . I - [D.P. MOHAPATRAAND P. VENKATARAMAREDD!, JJ.] ' -. . ~ '' Constitution of India, 1950...-:.Article 136-Special Leave Jurisdiction- Exercise of-Non- production of sanctionorder beforethe Magistrate at the C siage of committal of the case-Accused raising objectio'I of non-production of sanction for thefirsttime in revisionapplication and High Courtdismissing theapplication-Interference by Supreme Court-Held,not justifiedsince that would result infurtherdelay in holdingthe trial,more so whenthe petitioner inexplicably failed toraisethe objection at the earliest-Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 Sections196 and 193. ·D Charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner for offences under sections 120-B, 121, 121-A,122, 123 and 212 of the IPC and under sections 25(1)(A) and (B), 27 of theArmsAct beforethe Magistrate.Magistrate 'committedthe cafe to Sessions Court Beforechargeswere framedsanction order was produced before Sessions Court Petitionerfiled an application E for discharge on the ground that there was no prima facieevidence to frame charge againsthim. The applicationwas rejected.Petitionerthen filedrevision application under section397/401 Cr.P.C. and on the additional ground that the entireproceedingsincluding committal of the case to theSessions Court werevitiatedby illegality for want of sanction F under section 196 Cr.P.C.High Court dismissed the application.Hence the present Special Leave Petition. Dismissing the petition, the Court HELD: 1. The petitioner did not choose to raise the objection G regarding non- production of sanction order either before the Magistrate or evenbefore the Sessions Court. It was raised for the firsttimein the revisionapplicationfiled in the High Court. This contentioncould have beenconsideredby this Court, if substantialrelief could be grantedto the petitioner or if injustice could heaverted. At best, the matter could be senthack to the Magistrateto go through a freshprocess of committal H 406 -- DHARMESH@ NANU NITINBHAI v. ST ATE 407 after receivingthe sanction order filed by theprosecution.In anycase, A · the matter wouldhave to comeup to theSessions Court again. The compliancewith the formalitywould only result in furtherdelay in holding thetrial,withoutany corresponding advan~age to thepetitioner. Such a situation should not be permitted to happen whileexercising the jurisdictionunder Article136, moreso whenthe petitionerinexplicably B failed to raise the objection at theearliest.Evidently, he chose to raise theobjections in piecemealwithout apparentjustification.Hence it is not afitcaseto interfereunder Article 136. (411-A-D] 2. The que.tion whetherthe sanction order underSection196 is requiredto beproducedbefore the Magistratewho takescognizancein C the first instance or before the Sessions Court whichhas exclusive jurisdictionto try the offencehas beenleft openby the Court, while observingthat the Sessions Court alsotakescognizance of the offence irrespective of theMagistratetaking cognizancethereof for thepurpose ofcommittal of thecase. [410-E, F] RR. Chari v. State of UP .. [1951] SCR 312; Superintendent and Remembrancer of LegalAffairs,West Bengal v. AbaniKumarBanerjee. AIR 1950 Cal. 437; RajenderKumar Jain v. State, [1983] I SCC 435; State of UP. v. LakshmiBrahman, [1983] 2 SCC 372 and GangulaAshok v. State of Andhr.a Pradesh, ]2000] 2 SCC 504, referredto. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SpecialLeave Petition (CRL) No. 662 of 2002. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.2001 of the GujaratHigh Court in Crl.R.A. No. 542 of 2000. R.K. Mahesshwari,Waqar Ahmed, H.P. Sharma, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. ShallyBhasinMaheshwariand Ms. Ritu Rastogi for the Petitioner. S.K. Dholakia, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Anu Sawhney and Ms. Aruna Gupta,for theRespondent. TheJudgment of the Court was delivered by P. VENKATARAMAREDDI, J. This Special Leave Petition arises out of theorderpassed by the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court of Gujarat,rejectingthe revisionapplicationfiled by the petitioner herein against D E F G the order of Addi. SessionsJudge, Ahmedabad.A charge-sheetfor offences H 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. I S.C.R. A punishableunder Sections 120-B, 121, 121-A,122,123,212 IPC and under Sections25(l)(A)and (B),27 of the ArmsAct cameto befiledby thepolice on12thApril, 2000 in the Court of MetropolitanMagistrate. The petitioner figuresas accusedNo.9 therein.The casebeingtriableexclusivelyby the Court of Sessions,thelearned Magistratesubmitted the caseto theCourt of B CitySessionsby an orderdated 4.5.2000. Sanctionfor prosecution as required by Section 196(1) of theCriminal Procedure Codewas obtainedon 7thMay, 2000, suchsanction being necessary in view of the factthatthe petitioner standsaccused of some of the offencesfalling under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Codeviz. collection of armsfor thepurpose of wagingwar againstthe Governmentetc. Sanctionaccordedby the State Governmentwas produced C beforethe Court of Sessionsbefore the chargewas framedagainst the petitioner-accused.The petitioner applied to the Court of Sessionsfor discharge onthegroundthat therewas no prima-facieevidence to framethe charge againsthim. Thatapplicationwas rejectedby thelearnedAddi. Sessions Judge,Ahmedabad.Thereupon, a revisionpetition was filed in the High Courtunder S. 397/401 Cr.P.C. In that revisionan additionalground was D raised for thefirsttimethat the entireproceedingsincluding committal of the caseto theCourt of Sessionsare vitiatedbyillegalityfor want of sanction under S. 196 Cr.P.C. and,therefore,the criminalproceedingscannot go on againsthim. The HighCourtby theimpugnedorder dated 3. l l.2001 dismissed therevisionapplication,rejecting both the groundsurged. Hence,this Special E Leave Petition. After noticeto the State, wehaveheardthe learnedcounsel. We are concernedhere withthe secondground,that is to say,the effect of non-production of sanctionorder beforethe learnedMagistratewho committedthe caseto theCourt of Sessionsas that is theonlypointurged before us. TheHighCourtwas of the viewthat whilecommittingthe case F to theCourt of Sessions,the Magistratecannot be said to havetakencognizance of the offence. "It cannotbe laid down", observedthe learnedjudge "that unless Magistratetakes cognizance,he cannotcommitthe caseto theCourt of Sessions". TheLearnedjudge, after referringto thedecisions of Calcutta andKeralaHigh Courts,observedthus: "In both the decisions reliedupon on G behalf of the petitioner,it hasbeenlaid downthat the committalproceedings is an enquirybefore the Magistrate. It is notnecessary,therefore, that during theenquiry,Magistrate is obliged to takecognizance of the offence.The glaringexample is in Section200 Crl.P.C. whenMagistrateconducts enquiry beforeissuingprocessunder Section 204 ........ ". The learnedJudge of the HighCourtthereforeheld that the banunder S. 196( l) is not attractedto the H committalproceedings.The correctness of the viewtakenby theHighCourt DHARMESH@NANUNITINBHAlv. STATE [P. VENKATARAMAREDDI, J.] 409 hasbeenquestionedbefore us. Section 196 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedureenjoins that "no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable underChapter VI of the IndianPenal Code,exceptwith the previoussanction of the Central Governmentor of the State Government". The sanction of the Government A is thusa pre-conditionfor thecognizance of the offencesspecifiedin various B clauses of Section 196. Section 193 enactsa baragainstthe Court of Sessions takingcognizance of any offenceas a Court of originaljurisdiction unless the casehas beencommittedto ii by a Magistrateunder the provisions of the Code.However, if the Code or anylawin forceexpresslyprovides for the Court of Sessionsdirectly taking cognizance,the fetterunderSection 193 C does not apply.The otherprovisionwhich deservesnotice is Section 209. It provides for commitment of case if it appearsto theMagistratethat the offence is triableexclusively by the Court of Sessions. In R.R Chariv. State o/U.P., (1951SCR312), thisCourtobserved,relying on thedicta in Gopal Marwari v. Emperor,AIR (1943)Patna 245 that the word'cognizance'was usedin theCodeto indicatea pointwhena Magistrateor a Judgefirst takes D judicialnotice of an offence and that it is a differentthing from the initiation of proceeding.The followingexposition of law by DasGupta, J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer of LegalAffairs,West Bengal v. Abani KumarBanerjee,AIR (1950) Cal. 437 was quotedwith approvalby the SupremeCourt: "What is taking cognizancehas not beendefined in the Criminal ProcedureCode and I haveno desireto attemptto defineit. It seems E to me clear howeverthat beforeit canbe saidthat any magistratehas takencognizance of any offenceunder section 190(1) (a), Criminal ProcedureCode, he must not only haveapplied his mind to thecontents F of thepetitionbut he musthave doneso forthepurpose of proceeding in a particularway as indicated in thesubsequentprovisions of this Chapter-proceedingunder section 200 and thereaftersending it for inquiryand reportunder section 202. Whenthe Magistrateapplies hismindnot for thepurpose of proceedingunder the subsequent sections of thisChapter,but for takingaction of some other.kind, G e.g., orderinginvestigationunder section156(3), or issuinga search warrantfor thepurpose of the investigation,he cannotbe saidto have. takencognizance of the offence." Both the learnedcounselrelied on theabovepassageto supporttheir arguments.That apart,the learnedcounselfor thepetitionerrelying on the H 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP.I S.C.R. A observationsmade in .the decision of thisCourt in RajenderKumar Jain v. State, [1983]l SCC 435 and State of U.P. v. LakshmiBrahman, [1983] 2 SCC 372 submitsthat the committal,even underthe newCode,is nota mechanicalact, but a judicialfunctionto beperformedby theMagistrate. TheMagistratehas to be satisfiedthat an offence is primafacie disclosedand suchoffence is triableexclusivelyby a Court of Sessions.The fact thatthe B proceedingbefore the Magistrateis in the nature of an inquirydoes not make anydifference,according to thelearnedcounsel.The learnedcounselthen submitsthat the inquiryculminates in makingthe order of commitmentand thusfacilitatestrial beforethe Court of Sessionsand thereforethe dictalaid downby DasGupta, J. applieswith full force.The fact thatthe Court of C Sessionsis disabledfrom takingcognizanceas a Court of originaljurisdiction (videSection193) is a definitepoint that the Magistratetakes cognizance beforepassingan order of commitment,argues the learnedcounsel. Thelearnedcounselfor therespondent State seekssupportfrom the judgment of theHighCourtand furthercontendsthat the proceedingsare not D vitiatedmerely for thereasonthat the sanctionorder was not producedat the stage of committal of thecase. Thoughthere is considerableforce in the argument of thelearnedcounsel forthepetitionerthat the Magistratedoes take cognizance of the offence beforecommittingthe caseto theCourt of Sessions,still the questionremains E whether the sanctionorder is requiredto beproducedbefore the Magistrate whotakescognizance in the firstinstance or beforethe SessionsCourt which hasexclusivejurisdictionto trytheoffence.Though the SessionsCourt cannot takecognizance of the offenceas a Court of originaljurisdiction,it hasto necessarilytake cognizancebefore commencingthe trialaftercommittal. F That the SessionsCourt takes cognizance of the offenceirrespective of the factwhetherthe committalMagistrateat ananteriorpoint of time had taken cognizance of thesameoffencefor thepurpose of committalcannot be doubted. If anyauthorityis needed,we mayreferto thefollowingobservations in Gangula Ashok v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2000] 2 SCC 504) :- G "The section imposesan interdicton allCourts of Sessionagainst takingcognizance of any offenceas a court of originaljurisdiction. Itcantakecognizanceonly if 'the casehas beencommittedto it by aMagistrate',as provided in the Code." We arenotinclinedto discussthe issuefurtherand expressour opinion H on thequestionformulatedin theprecedingparagraph.We are of the view DHARMESH@NANUNITINBHAlv. STATE [P. VENKATARAMAREDDI, J.] 411 thatit isnota fitcase to interfereby grantingleave in exercise of jurisdiction A under Article136. Firstly,as alreadynoticed,the petitionerdid not choose toraisethe objectionregardingsanction either beforethe Magistrateor even beforethe Sessions Court. The onlypointurgedbeforethe learned Sessions Judge in theapplicationfor dischargewas that thereis no evidenceeven primafacie to connectthe accusedwith the offence.The contentionregarding B non-production of the order of sanctionbefore the Magistratewas urgedfor thefirsttimein theRevisionfiled in theHighCourt.Even then, we could haveconsideredthis contention, if substantialrelief couldbe grantedto the petitioneror if injustice could be averted.Assumingthat the petitioneris right in hiscontention,at best,the matterhas to besentback to the Magistrate togothrougha freshprocess of committalafter receivingthe sanctionorder C filed by theprosecution. In anycase,the matterwould have to comeup to the Sessions Courtagain.The compliancewith the formalitywould only resultin furtherdelay in holdingthe trial,withoutany correspondingadvantage tothepetitioner. Such a situationshould not be permittedto happenwhile exercisingthe jurisdictionunder Article136, moreso whenthe petitioner inexplicablyfailed to raisethe objectionat theearliest.Evidently,he chose D to raisethe objections in piecemealwithout apparentjustification.For these reasons,the petitionis dismissed. N.J. Petition dismissed. |
