NDLI: Moral responsibility for unprevented harm

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Moral responsibility for unprevented harm

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Klampfer, Friderik
Copyright Year	2004
Abstract	That we are morally responsible for what we do willingly and knowingly is a commonplace. That our moral responsibility extends as far as to cover at least the intended consequences of our voluntary actions and perhaps also the ones we did not intend, but could or did foresee, is equally beyond dispute. But what about omissions? Are we, or can we be, (equally) morally responsible for the harm that has occured because we did not prevent it, even though we could have done so? Say, for all the enormous suffering, caused daily by famine, deprivation and curable diseases in the Third World countries?Moral intuitions and practices that one could consult in this matter seem to leave us in the dark. We regularly ascribe responsibility to people for harms resulting from their negligence or failure to fulfill professional duties. On the other hand, we tend to think that unless there is some evidence of the causal contribution that agents made to a harmful event and/or state, it is not really fair to blame it on them. And finally, to complicate things even more, most of us deny that omissions could effect anything (any change) in the world and consequently regard them as causally impotent (as well as possibly harmless).Most of the proposed solutions to this perplexing issue simply take negative moral responsibility for granted and then either try to revise our ordinary notion of causation accordingly or, alternatively, weaken the conditions for holding someone morally responsible. In the paper I present and defend the relative merits of the third approach, one sceptical of the notion of moral responsibility for the ‘outcomes’ of omissions. I try to show that for some identifiable core notion of moral responsibility and paradigmatic cases of omissions, the prospects for a happy marriage are rather slim.
Starting Page	119
Ending Page	161
Page Count	43
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03535150
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume Number	19
Issue Number	33
e-ISSN	18746349
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2004-01-01
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	moral and legal responsibility causation acts and omissions causing and allowing harm Logic Metaphysics Epistemology Philosophy of Mind
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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