NDLI: The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Davenport, John
Copyright Year	2006
Abstract	Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few years, there have been several different attempts to defend Frankfurtian critiques of PAP in response this dilemma. In a novel approach, Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna present cases in which all deliberatively relevant or “robust” alternatives are blocked, but the agent’s act or decision is not determined. Pereboom and McKenna argue that any plausible leeway-condition on responsibility must characterize the required alternatives as robust in two ways: being voluntary performances and having a practical relevance accessible to the agent’s mind.I agree with the requirement of robustness, and argue that we can build this notion into a complex concept of agent-possibility, or “agentive-can.” However, I argue that both McKenna’s and Pereboom’s conceptions of robustness are too demanding: they exclude alternatives that are intuitively relevant. Moreover, I argue that the alternative of refraining from deciding, or voluntarily failing to decide, is robust in the right sense. In agreement with a tradition running from Ockham back through Scotus to Aquinas, I argue that this robust alternative is necessary for responsibility. If the Frankfurt-controller eliminates it, then the agent’s responsibility is undermined. In particular, I argue that Pereboom’s tax evasion cases do not refute this leeway-condition on moral responsibility.
Starting Page	62
Ending Page	88
Page Count	27
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03535150
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume Number	21
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	18746349
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2006-01-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	free will robustness deliberation decision tracing Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Mind
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding : a response to mckenna and pereboom ”

Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane

Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases

Vargas-Style Revisionism and the Problem of Retributivism

A new approach to manipulation arguments

A maneuver around the modified manipulation argument

Close Calls and the Confident Agent: Free Will, Deliberation, and Alternative Possibilities

Black the libertarian

Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Similar Documents

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding : a response to mckenna and pereboom ”

Replies to McKenna, Pereboom, and Kane

Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases

Vargas-Style Revisionism and the Problem of Retributivism

A new approach to manipulation arguments

A maneuver around the modified manipulation argument

Close Calls and the Confident Agent: Free Will, Deliberation, and Alternative Possibilities

Black the libertarian

Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom