NDLI: Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke’s Referential Turn and its Challenges

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Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke’s Referential Turn and its Challenges

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Miščević, Nenad
Copyright Year	2008
Abstract	The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke’s pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to a possible Benacerraf-like dilemma for conceptualist accounts of armchair knowledge: if concepts are akin to representational contents and/or conceptions, they certainly do not metaphysically determine anything. At best, they fallibly guide our inquiry and get corrected almost by each new important discovery about the nature of their referents. If what is meant by “concept” is a Fregean, objectively correct and metaphysically potent entity, there is little doubt in its power to determine its referent(s), but there is a huge epistemic problem of how we grasp such Platonic concepts. Peacocke’s early metaphysics of concept, which offered beginnings of an answer, is put in jeopardy by the new referential turn, and his valiant attempts to pass between the multiple horns of this dilemma seem to face a lot of difficulties.
Starting Page	233
Ending Page	256
Page Count	24
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03535150
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume Number	23
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	18746349
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2008-10-01
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	A priori Concept Conceptualism Peacocke Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Metaphysics Logic Philosophy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

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