NDLI: Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Bates, Jared
Copyright Year	2004
Abstract	The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification are in fact in reflective equilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory choices in empirical sciences. If reflective equilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology.
Starting Page	45
Ending Page	64
Page Count	20
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03535150
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume Number	19
Issue Number	32
e-ISSN	18746349
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2004-01-01
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	reflective equilibrium underdetermination methodology naturalism theory of justification intuition Logic Metaphysics Epistemology Philosophy of Mind
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

In defense of reflective equilibrium

Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership

In defence of error theory

Uncovering buried treasure: Henderson and Horgan on conceptual analysis

Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition

The nature of intuitive justification

Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning

Functional role semantics and reflective equilibrium

Two skeptical arguments or only one?

Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology

Similar Documents

In defense of reflective equilibrium

Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership

In defence of error theory

Uncovering buried treasure: Henderson and Horgan on conceptual analysis

Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition

The nature of intuitive justification

Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning

Functional role semantics and reflective equilibrium

Two skeptical arguments or only one?

Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology