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Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Fehr, Ernst Fischbacher, Urs Gächter, Simon
Copyright Year	2002
Abstract	This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	25
Page Count	25
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10456767
Journal	Human Nature
Volume Number	13
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	19364776
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2002-01-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Evolution Game theory Human cooperation Punishment Social norms Strong reciprocity Anthropology Behavioural Sciences Biological Psychology
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Sociology and Political Science Arts and Humanities Anthropology Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics

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