NDLI: Sellars Contra McDowell on Intuitional Content and the Myth of the Given

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Christias, Dionysis
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	The aim of this paper is to properly situate and contrast McDowell’s and Sellars’ views on intuitional content and relate them to their corresponding views on the myth of the Given. Although McDowell’s and Sellars’ views on what McDowell calls ‘intuitional’ content seem at first strikingly similar, at a deeper level they are radically different. It will be suggested that this divergence is intimately related to their different understanding of what the myth of the Given consists in and how it should be best avoided. It will also be argued that certain McDowell-inspired objections against the viability of the Sellarsian concept of the Categorial Given actually misconstrue the place of this notion in Sellars’ system. If the myth of the Categorial Given can be considered as a genuine version of the Myth (and McDowell has offered no compelling reasons for thinking otherwise) then McDowell’s account of intuitional content does indeed fall prey to it. I shall further argue that a McDowell-inspired objection against Sellars to the effect that his account of proper sensibles compromises the openness of intuitional content to the world ultimately fails, and, finally, I shall suggest that Sellars’ views on proper sensibles and intuitional content provide a more promising account of the way our thought and experience can be rationally open to the world itself than McDowell’s position.
Starting Page	975
Ending Page	998
Page Count	24
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00483893
Journal	Philosophia
Volume Number	43
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15749274
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2015-07-10
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Sellars McDowell Intuitional content Myth of the Categorial Given Proper and common sensibles Rational ‘openness’ Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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