NDLI: A Note on the Ultimatum Paradox, Bounded Rationality, and Uncertainty

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Webster, Thomas J.
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	The ultimatum game is a sequential-move bargaining game in which a giver offers a taker a share of a monetary pie. The predicted subgame perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum game is for purely rational givers who act in their own narrow self-interest to offer the smallest possible share of a monetary price, and for purely rational takers to accept. Experimental trials suggest, however, that givers make generous offers because they have a taste for fairness. The analysis presented in this paper argues that it is in the best interest of givers of any type to make offers that will not be rejected, and that offers become more generous as a giver’s uncertainty about the taker’s reservation offer increases.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	10
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10830898
Journal	International Advances in Economic Research
Volume Number	19
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	1573966X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2012-11-11
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General Noncooperative Games Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles Ultimatum game Fairness Pure rationality Bounded rationality Uncertainty Economics general Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics International Economics Microeconomics Economic Growth
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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