NDLI: Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Bendor, Jonathan Swistak, Piotr
Copyright Year	1998
Abstract	To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions we re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts. The first part is conceptual: it identifies the evolutionary model's assumptions and shows how different assumptions imply different types of evolutionary stability. The second part is deductive: it establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the types of evolutionary stability identified in the first part, and demonstrates in which games these kinds of stability can (and cannot) be attained. The third and final part is applied: it relates the general findings (which are independent of the specific payoffs of any particular evolutionary game) to the issue of the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Results on cooperation appear throughout the paper as they both exemplify and motivate the general results. These results essentially explain when cooperation is and is not stable, and why, thus shedding new light on the meaning and applicability of Axelrod's widely known claims.
Starting Page	99
Ending Page	159
Page Count	61
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00405833
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume Number	45
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	15737187
Language	English
Publisher	Kluwer Academic Publishers
Publisher Date	1998-01-01
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Economics/Management Science Operation Research/Decision Theory Methodology of the Social Sciences
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Arts and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Developmental and Educational Psychology Social Sciences Decision Sciences Applied Psychology Computer Science Applications

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