NDLI: Socially Structured Games

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Herings, P. Jean Jacques Laan, Gerard Talman, Dolf
Copyright Year	2006
Abstract	We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power.We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core.We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	29
Page Count	29
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00405833
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume Number	62
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15737187
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2006-12-05
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	balancedness core non-transferable utility game social stability Operations Research/Decision Theory Methodology of the Social Sciences Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Game Theory/Mathematical Methods Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Arts and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Developmental and Educational Psychology Social Sciences Decision Sciences Applied Psychology Computer Science Applications

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