NDLI: R&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Mukherjee, Vivekananda Ramani, Shyama V.
Copyright Year	2009
Abstract	Starting from the premise that firms are distinct in terms of their capacity to create innovations, this article explores the rationale for R&D cooperation and the choice between alliances that involve information sharing, cost sharing or both. Defining innovative capability as the probability of creating an innovation, it examines firm strategy in a duopoly market, where firms have to decide whether or not to cooperate to acquire a fixed cost R&D infrastructure that would endow each firm with a firm-specific innovative capability. Furthermore, since emerging industries are often characterized by high technological uncertainty and diverse firm focus that makes the exploitation of spillovers difficult, this article focuses on a zero spillover context. It demonstrates that asymmetry has an impact on alliance choice and social welfare, as a function of ex-post market competition and fixed costs of R&D. With significant asymmetry no alliance may be formed, while with similar firms the cost sharing alliance is dominant. Finally, it ascertains the settings under which the equilibrium outcome is distinct from that maximizing social welfare, thereby highlighting some conditions under which public investment in a technology park can be justified.
Starting Page	373
Ending Page	394
Page Count	22
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00405833
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume Number	71
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15737187
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2009-11-17
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	R&D competition R&D cooperation Technology parks Operations Research/Decision Theory Methodology of the Social Sciences Game Theory/Mathematical Methods Economic Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Arts and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Developmental and Educational Psychology Social Sciences Decision Sciences Applied Psychology Computer Science Applications

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