NDLI: The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Dickinson, David L.
Copyright Year	2007
Abstract	In bargaining environments with uncertain disagreement or “impasse” outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that confounds data interpretation. Specifically, the minimally acceptable settlement value from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased-belief bargainer is empirically indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimistically (optimistically) biased beliefs. This article reports results from a controlled bargaining experiment where data on both risk attitude and beliefs under uncertainty are generated in order to assess their relative importance in bargaining experiment outcomes. The average lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic with respect to uncertainty, which is consistent with existing studies that examine each in isolation. I also find that the effects of optimism dominate those of risk-aversion. Optimistic bargainers are significantly more likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions. Dispute rates are not statistically affected by risk attitude, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to a weakened bargaining position. Though additional research is needed to understand the limits of extending these results, a key implication follows. In uncertainty environments where optimism dominates, increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.
Starting Page	69
Ending Page	101
Page Count	33
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00405833
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume Number	66
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15737187
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2007-07-24
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	risk preference optimism bargaining experiments dispute resolution Operations Research/Decision Theory Methodology of the Social Sciences Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Game Theory/Mathematical Methods Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Arts and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Developmental and Educational Psychology Social Sciences Decision Sciences Applied Psychology Computer Science Applications

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