NDLI: Relative difference contest success function

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Beviá, Carmen Corchón, Luis C
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	In this paper, we present a contest success function (CSF), which is homogeneous of degree zero and in which the probability of winning the prize depends on the relative difference of efforts. In a simultaneous game with two players, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is unique and interior. This condition does not depend on the size of the valuations as in an absolute difference CSF. We prove that several properties of Nash equilibrium with the Tullock CSF still hold in our framework. Finally, we consider the case of $$n$$ players, generalize the previous condition and show that this condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. For some parameter values of our CSF and when all players are identical, equilibrium entails full rent dissipation for any number of players.
Starting Page	377
Ending Page	398
Page Count	22
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00405833
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume Number	78
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15737187
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2014-03-09
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Contest success functions Contest Nash equilibrium Economic Theory Game Theory/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Operations Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Arts and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Developmental and Educational Psychology Social Sciences Decision Sciences Applied Psychology Computer Science Applications

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