NDLI: Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Brown, Jessica
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the wrong sort of judgement, or the wrong kind of judge, or that the results of the surveys do not generate scepticism about philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, but rather a more problematic and general scepticism. I argue that the last of these general replies is the most promising. To assess its merits, I consider the most developed account of how the survey results are supposed to raise sceptical problems specifically for philosophical appeal to intuition, that presented in Weinberg (Midwest Stud Philos XXXI:318–343, 2007). I argue that there are significant objections to Weinberg’s account. I conclude that, so far, experimental philosophers have failed to show how their survey results raise a sceptical challenge that applies to philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, rather than having a problematic, more general scope.
Starting Page	2021
Ending Page	2046
Page Count	26
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00397857
Journal	Synthese
Volume Number	190
Issue Number	12
e-ISSN	15730964
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2011-05-01
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Experimental philosophy Methodology Intuition Scepticism Philosophy of Science Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Language Metaphysics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Social Sciences

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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