NDLI: Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Baltag, Alexandru Smets, Sonja Zvesper, Jonathan Alexander
Copyright Year	2009
Abstract	We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality.
Starting Page	301
Ending Page	333
Page Count	33
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00397857
Journal	Synthese
Volume Number	169
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	15730964
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2009-05-18
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Backward induction Dynamic logic Epistemic logic Public announcements Rationality Metaphysics Philosophy of Language Logic Epistemology Computer Science Philosophy of Science
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Social Sciences

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

Entitlement, value and rationality

Entitlement and rationality

Extending probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic

Grounded rationality: Descriptivism in epistemic context

Epistemic instrumentalism

Dynamic epistemic logic with branching temporal structures

Inference and update

The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

Similar Documents

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

Entitlement, value and rationality

Entitlement and rationality

Extending probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic

Grounded rationality: Descriptivism in epistemic context

Epistemic instrumentalism

Dynamic epistemic logic with branching temporal structures

Inference and update

The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox