NDLI: Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Smyth, Russell Söderberg, Magnus
Copyright Year	2010
Abstract	This article tests the public interest and regulatory capture hypotheses, in the context of the Swedish electricity market, by studying the factors influencing the Swedish Energy Agency’s decision to replace decision-makers it employs to hear customer complaints against utilities. The study covers the period from the beginning of 1996, when a series of regulatory reforms were introduced to improve consumer protection, until the end of 2008. The study concludes that decision-makers who find in favor of customers have had a statistically lower probability of being removed, consistent with public interest theory. A transitory effect of favoring utilities can be observed for the period from 2 to 6 years following the reforms. In this period, government and public scrutiny of the regulator, which had been high in the immediate aftermath of the reforms, had waned and there were few precedents decided by the courts that the regulator was required to follow. This vacuum created an opportunity for the utilities to increase their influence over the regulator. Once the courts started establishing precedents in relatively large numbers, the supervisory role of the courts ensured that the actions of the regulator were scrutinized. This development has served a similar function to government and public scrutiny in the years immediately following the reforms in promoting the public interest.
Starting Page	292
Ending Page	312
Page Count	21
File Format	PDF
ISSN	0922680X
Journal	Journal of Regulatory Economics
Volume Number	38
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15730468
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2010-09-29
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Electricity Public interest Regulatory capture Microeconomics Public Finance & Economics Industrial Organization
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
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