NDLI: Make or buy new technology: The role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Xue, Yanfeng
Copyright Year	2007
Abstract	A firm’s board of directors, based on its risk tolerance or “appetite,” sets the corporate objectives. It is then the management’s job to meet the objectives by adopting appropriate strategies. However, the board can design compensation policies to encourage desired management strategy choices. This paper explores the extent to which management compensation policies are aligned with strategy choices for obtaining new technology. Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions, often labeled “make” and “buy” strategies, respectively. The “make” strategy is inherently more risky, with much of the high risk idiosyncratic. Furthermore, U.S. GAAP requires that R&D expenditures be expensed but allows capitalization of acquisition costs, thus a firm using the “make” as opposed to the “buy” strategy will experience a greater negative effect on accounting earnings. I hypothesize that these differences will lead risk-averse and utility-maximizing managers to implement the “buy” strategy if their compensation is heavily weighted on accounting-based performance measures. Conversely, managers with more stock-based compensation, especially stock options, are more likely to choose to develop new technology internally. Using data from U.S. high-tech industries and a simultaneous equations regression framework, I find evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.
Starting Page	659
Ending Page	690
Page Count	32
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13806653
Journal	Review of Accounting Studies
Volume Number	12
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15737136
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2007-05-12
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	R&D Mergers and acquisitions Compensation Technology Public Finance & Economics Finance /Banking Accounting/Auditing
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Accounting

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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